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Newspapers are in trouble.  Circulation and advertising are 
down as readers shift from print to online media.1  Their future 
looks even worse.2  Although changing reader preferences and the 
 
 Marget Larson Professor of Intellectual Property Law, University of Nebraska. 
 1 Newspaper circulation has dropped 30% over the past two decades and advertising 
revenues are now less than half of their 2006 total. Rick Edmonds et al., Newspapers: By 
the Numbers, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2012, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/ 
newspapers-building-digital-revenues-proves-painfully-slow/newspapers-by-the-
numbers.  Forty percent of Americans now get most of their news from the Internet, 
while only 20% said the same for newspapers. Kenny Olmstead et al., Digital: News 
Gains Audience but Loses Ground in Chase for Revenue, THE STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 
2012, http://stateofthemedia.org/2012/digital-news-gains-audience-but-loses-more-
ground-in-chase-for-revenue. 
 2 Among 18–34 year-olds, less than 25% said they had read a newspaper the previous 
day. Edmonds et al., supra note 1.  Only financial newspapers such as the Wall Street 
Journal have so far succeeded in enticing online readers to pay in significant numbers, 
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loss of lucrative classified advertising to online sources are major 
worries, the news media seems preoccupied with news aggregators 
and bloggers who distribute news content on the Internet without 
permission.3  Newspapers are not the only parties worried about 
the unauthorized distribution of “their” news on the Internet.  
Financial services companies are unhappy about the distribution of 
their “hot” stock recommendations and analysis,4 while other 
content providers seek to control online news ranging from movie 
schedules5 to business ratings.6 
Traditional copyright doctrine offers varying degrees of 
protection for the literary format of the news—broad in scope for 
the text of news stories, narrower and more uncertain for smaller 
expressions like news headlines and leads (sometimes spelled 
“ledes”).7  Content providers want more.8  They increasingly seek 
to control the online distribution of not only their literary forms, 
but also the very facts that constitute the news itself.9  Major media 
 
but early results for The New York Times as it moves to limit free online access look 
promising. Id.  It is still unclear whether that strategy will succeed for more modest 
publications. 
 3 Executives working for Rupert Murdoch, chairman of News Corp., have called news 
aggregator Google a “tech tapeworm” and a “parasite.” Ian Burrell, Google Caves in to 
Murdoch after Attack on “Parasites,” INDEPENDENT (UK), Dec. 3, 2009, at 18.  Murdoch 
himself is quoted as saying, “[t]o aggregate stories is not fair use.  To be impolite, it is 
theft.” Id.  The chairman of Associated Press has said, “[w]e can no longer stand by and 
watch others walk off with our work under misguided legal theories.” Staci D. Kramer, 
AP Launching News Industry Campaign to “Protect” News Content, WASHINGTON POST 
(Apr. 6, 2009, 4:07 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2009/04/06/AR2009040601970.html. 
 4 See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc. (Barclays II), 650 F.3d 
876 (2d Cir. 2011); Agora Fin., LLC, v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491 (D. Md. 2010). 
 5 See, e.g., Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 
2d 1044 (E.D. Mo. 1999). 
 6 See, e.g., Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. Inc., 634 F. 
Supp. 2d 1226 (D. Colo. 2009). 
 7 See generally Andrew Mirsky, Fair Use and Online Publishing: Legal and Practical 
Guidance for Publishers, 78 PA. B.A. Q. 171, 172–74 (2007) (describing copyright and 
fair use in the context of “reporting and uses of headlines, stories and other publisher 
content by . . . web portals”).  
 8 See, e.g., Bruce W. Sanford, Bruce D. Brown & Laurie A. Babinski, Saving 
Journalism with Copyright Reform and the Doctrine of Hot News, 26 COMM. LAW. 8, 8–9 
(2009).  
 9 Brief for Amicus Curiae the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n (Sifma) in Support 
of Affirmance at 1–3, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372-cv), 2010 
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companies and giant online news distributors are now engaged in a 
struggle over the rules that will govern access to factual 
information on the Internet.10  The battle to control facts is being 
waged on two fronts.  One involves an attempt to extend the 
traditional scope of copyright beyond the protection of expression 
into the previously forbidden realm of facts, as plaintiffs claim 
copyright in everything from car and coin prices to financial data.11  
The second front involves efforts by content providers to enlist the 
century-old common law tort of misappropriation, previously 
repudiated by the likes of Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Learned Hand, Richard Posner, and the American Law Institute.12  
 
WL 3032824; First Amended Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and 
Copyright Infringement, Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 Civ. 00546 
(D.D.C. filed Apr. 26, 2005), 2005 WL 5834897.   
 10 Agence France-Presse, Associated Press, Gannett Co., N.Y. Times Co., Washington 
Post, the publisher Reed Elsevier, the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association, Google, Twitter, and the Electronic Frontier Foundation all were among the 
businesses and interest groups who filed amici curiae briefs in Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 
(2d Cir. 2011), the latest battle over the use of facts on the Internet. See, e.g., Brief for 
Amicus Curiae Sifma, supra note 9. 
 11 See., e.g., Barclays II, 650 F. 3d 876 (2d. Cir. 2011) (financial data); N.Y. 
Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (car 
prices); CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999) (coin prices). 
 12 Justices Holmes and Brandeis both filed dissents in the case that gave birth to the 
misappropriation doctrine. See Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press (INS), 248 U.S. 215, 
246–67 (1918).  Learned Hand, writing for the Second Circuit, attempted to confine the 
doctrine to news-gathering organizations operating during the First World War.  
Responding to a plaintiff’s reliance on the misappropriation doctrine as articulated in 
INS, Judge Hand wrote in Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), 
cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930): 
Although that concerned another subject-matter—printed news 
dispatches—we agree that, if it meant to lay down a general doctrine, 
it would cover this case; at least, the language of the majority opinion 
goes so far. We do not believe that it did. While it is of course true 
that law ordinarily speaks in general terms, there are cases where the 
occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is 
decided. This appears to us such an instance; we think that no more 
was covered than situations substantially similar to those then at bar. 
The difficulties of understanding it otherwise are insuperable. 
 Id. at 280.  Judge Richard Posner, in Misappropriation: A Dirge, said, “[c]larity of 
analysis would be enhanced if the doctrine and the very word were banished from 
discussions of intellectual property law.” 40 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 641 (2003).  The 
American Law Institute also tried to put an end to the misappropriation tort.  “The better 
approach, and the one most likely to achieve an appropriate balance between the 
competing interests, does not recognize a residual common law tort of misappropriation.”  
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A major decision by the Second Circuit in Barclays Capital Inc. v. 
Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.13 only postponed the ultimate reckoning 
with a narrow holding that denied relief against the unauthorized 
distribution of the plaintiffs’ stock recommendations.  The 
reemergence of the misappropriation tort from the shadow of 
federal copyright law is somewhat improbable, resting as it does 
on a single paragraph of legislative history, extracted from an ABA 
Committee Report directed at a portion of the copyright revision 
bill that was never actually enacted.14  Nevertheless, the tort’s 
application to news on the Internet has been cheered by numerous 
commentators.15  The outcome of these disputes over the 
appropriate boundaries of copyright and the viability of 
misappropriation tort will determine whether facts can be freely 
disseminated on the Internet.  After a short review of the current 
state of copyright protection for news, this article examines the 
recent attempts by content providers to gain control over facts 
through federal copyright law and the common law tort of 
misappropriation. 
I.  COPYRIGHT IN NEWS REPORTS 
A.  News Stories 
News providers already enjoy significant legal protection for 
their work.  The text of news stories has long been entitled to 
protection under copyright law.16  In the latest eruption over the 
copying of news content on the Internet, Barclays Capital and 
 
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (1995) § 38, cmt. b.  As co-reporter for the 
Restatement, I authored the text counseling elimination of the tort. 
 13 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 14 See infra text accompanying notes 303–37. 
 15 See infra notes 238–39. 
 16 “No doubt news articles often possess a literary quality, and are the subject of 
literary property at the common law; nor do we question that such an article, as a literary 
production, is the subject of copyright by the terms of the act as it now stands.” INS, 248 
U.S. at 234.  The history of copyright in news stories is explored in Robert Brauneis, The 
Transformation of Originality in the Progressive-Era Debate Over Copyright in News, 27 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321 (2009).  Not everyone believes that copyright is 
appropriate for news stories. See, e.g., Eric B. Easton, Who Owns “The First Rough Draft 
of History?”: Reconsidering Copyright in News, 27 COLUM. J.L & ARTS 521 (2004). 
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other major financial firms sued a news service that distributed 
information from the plaintiffs’ research reports to paying 
customers via an online newsfeed.17  The litigation focused mainly 
on the plaintiffs’ efforts to utilize the misappropriation doctrine to 
prevent the defendant from reporting on their market 
recommendations.18  In a few instances, however, the defendant 
had also distributed summaries containing verbatim copying of key 
excerpts from the plaintiffs’ research reports.19  That particular 
conduct posed few legal difficulties.  After abandoning an almost 
certainly futile fair use defense, the defendant was held liable for 
copyright infringement.20  Remedies included statutory damages, 
prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and a permanent injunction.21 
Systematic republication of news stories and excerpts is 
consistently held to be copyright infringement.  In Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.,22 for example, a 
defendant was held liable for distributing to its customers 
“abstracts”—actually “rough translations”—of news articles from 
the plaintiff’s financial newspapers.23  The Second Circuit 
reaffirmed the defendant’s right to republish the “facts” contained 
in the articles, but tracking an average of two-thirds of each article 
sentence by sentence was a prima facie infringement.24  
Predictably, the defendant raised a fair use defense under section 
107 of the Copyright Act.25  “News reporting,” after all, is listed in 
the preamble to section 107 as a use that may be amenable to fair 
 
 17 Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876. 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 180–216.  
 19 Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 883–84. 
 20 Id. at 886. 
 21 See Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc.(Barclays I), 700 F. Supp. 2d 
310, 328–31, rev’d on other grounds, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).  The defendant did 
not appeal the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their copyright claims. See Barclays 
II, 650 F.3d at 880. 
 22 166 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 23 Id. at 69. 
 24 Id. at 71.  Although a “close call,” the Second Circuit found insufficient quantitative 
similarity with respect to one excerpt that copied only the first paragraph of a six-
paragraph article. Id.  
 25 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). The fair use inquiry focuses on four factors: the purpose of 
the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount used by the defendant, and the 
effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work. See id. 
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use.26  The court in Nihon rejected the fair use defense, 
emphasizing that the use was not “transformative” because the 
defendant added nothing to the pre-existing works and its use 
served the same purpose as the originals.27  The market effect 
factor also “weighed strongly against fair use because Comline’s 
abstracts competed directly with the Nikkei articles.”28 
A similar result had been reached earlier by the same court in 
Wainwright Securities, Inc. v. Wall Street Transcript Corp.,29 when 
a weekly financial newspaper included abstracts of the plaintiff’s 
market research reports as a regular feature of its publication.30  
The fair use defense was rejected on the grounds that the copying 
was substantial in quantity and quality and reduced the economic 
value of the plaintiff’s reports.31 
A fair use argument is less easily dismissed when the copying 
of news stories provides a forum for criticism or commentary.  Los 
Angeles Times v. Free Republic32 thus seems a more difficult case 
than Nihon or Wainwright.  Free Republic was a website that 
allowed registered users to post current news articles.33  Users of 
the site could then comment on the posted articles.34  The Los 
Angeles Times and Washington Post claimed infringement.35  Free 
Republic argued that the postings were fair use, but the defense 
was rejected on summary judgment.36  Although conceding that 
 
 26 Id. 
 27 Nihon, 166 F.3d at 72. 
 28 Id. at 73. 
 29 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 (1978). 
 30 Id. at 94. 
 31 The court attempted a summary of the scope of copyright in news reports.  “What is 
protected is the manner of expression, the author’s analysis or interpretation of events, 
the way he structures his material and marshals facts, his choice of words, and the 
emphasis he gives to particular developments.” Id. at 95–96.  Inclusion of “the author’s 
analysis or interpretation of events” may go too far. See Harper & Row Publishers v. 
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 548 (1985) (“Especially in the realm of factual narrative, 
the law is currently unsettled regarding the ways in which uncopyrightable elements 
combine with the author’s original contributions to form protected expression.”). 
 32 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1453 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 33 Id. at 1555; see also FREE REPUBLIC, http://www.freerepublic.com (last visited Oct. 
4, 2012). 
 34 See L.A. Times, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1454. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. 
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commentary was a legitimate basis for fair use, the court said that 
the use reduced traffic to the plaintiffs’ own websites, resulting in 
lost advertising revenue and interfering with their ability to charge 
for online access.37 
The court’s chief concern, however, seemed to be whether the 
extent of the defendant’s use exceeded any legitimate 
justification.38  The court concluded that the defendant’s purpose 
of promoting public discussion could be served using only 
summaries of the news articles, or by using links to the articles 
themselves, which were hosted on the plaintiffs’ websites.39 
The court’s analysis of economic harm and the amount of the 
defendant’s use in Los Angeles Times v. Free Republic is 
potentially applicable to copying by bloggers and other 
commentators.  But perhaps a site like Free Republic that posts 
news on all subjects is a greater competitive threat to newspapers 
than are blogs limited to specific topics, and the court also stressed 
that the initial postings on Free Republic often consisted simply of 
copied news articles, with commentary added only by other 
users.40 
A series of infringement actions brought by Righthaven LLC 
against copiers of news articles in the Las Vegas Review-Journal 
indicates that the typical blogger may fare better than Free 
Republic.41  When a realtor posted an excerpt from a news story 
about housing sales on his Internet blog, along with a link to the 
full text, an infringement claim was dismissed on the basis of fair 
 
 37 See id. at 1471. 
 38 See id. at 1468. 
 39 Id. at 1464. 
 40 See id. at 1461.  
 41 Righthaven LLC, a law firm funded in part by the parent company of the Las Vegas 
Review-Journal for the purpose of controlling the use of its news material on the internet, 
has filed at least 250 copyright infringement suits after obtaining assignments of the 
posted materials from copyright owners. See Marc John Randazza, 
Copyrights/Infringement: Defense Arguments Against Righthaven Copyright Suits 
Multiply But Remain Untested, 81 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 729, 729 
(Apr. 1, 2011).  Many of the cases have been settled, presumably due to the leverage 
provided by the statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 
504(c)(2) (2006) (damages up to $150,000 per infringed work for willful infringements).   
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use.42  The purpose of the use was educational, only eight of thirty 
sentences had been reproduced, and the court found that the use 
was unlikely to affect the market for the news article.43 
Similarly, an Internet user who posted the entire text of a news 
article about public employee pensions on a website discussion 
forum won summary judgment on a fair use defense.44  Since the 
user’s non-commercial posting furthered discussion of state budget 
issues, the court found that even “wholesale” copying did not 
preclude a finding of fair use.45 
In yet another case brought by Righthaven, a non-profit 
organization dedicated to helping immigrants won a summary 
judgment when it posted the entire text of a news article on its 
website.46  The defendant’s burden on the fair use issue was eased 
since Righthaven could not show any harm to the limited interest 
in the copyright that had been assigned to it by the originating 
newspaper.47  The court also found that use of the entire article was 
reasonable given the educational purpose of the use and in order 
“to give the full flavor of the information.”48 
Thus, for whole articles and substantial excerpts, copyright 
generally provides reliable protection to news originators against 
competitive uses and, for better or for worse, imposes risks on 
even non-commercial copiers that may discourage wholesale and 
systematic redistribution. 
 
 42 Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., 96 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516, 1518 (D. 
Nev. 2010). 
 43 Id. 
 44 Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1145 (D. Nev. 2011).  The court 
also ordered dismissal of the action on the ground that Righthaven lacked standing to 
bring suit, finding that the assignment from the copyright owner did not grant Righthaven 
“ownership of any exclusive rights” in the work. Id. at 1146–47. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) 
(“[L]egal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright is entitled . . . to 
institute an action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she 
is the owner of it.”). Accord, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 
791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 976 (D. Nev. 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 
1265, 1271–72 (D. Colo. 2011). 
 45 Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149–50. 
 46 Righthaven LLC v. Jama, 2011 WL 1541613, at *1, *5 (D. Nev. 2011). 
 47 See id. at *4. 
 48 Id. at *3. 
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B.  Headlines and Leads 
The most common “use” of news content on the web may be 
the ubiquitous links that take users from an aggregation, blog, or 
other referring web site to news content on an originator’s own 
site.  The link itself is not problematic under copyright law.  Links 
are merely instructions that direct a user’s browser to a different 
web site—content is then reproduced, displayed, and distributed by 
the originator’s own site.49  To be useful, however, the link must 
be labeled, and in the case of news content, the most tempting and 
obvious label is the headline of the news story being linked.  If 
headlines are copyrightable, their use to label links is a potential 
infringement.  Some linking aggregators and bloggers take more, 
however, offering users not only a link labeled with a news 
headline but also a portion of the article’s lead paragraph, written 
to give readers the main idea of the story, usually with an emphasis 
on attention-grabbing facts. 
 
 49 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that a link to copyrighted material does not violate the display or distribution 
right granted copyright owners in 17 U.S.C. § 106(3), (5)).  One type of link might be 
more problematic.  In an early online news case, several news companies sued a web site 
that provided links to news content located on the plaintiffs’ sites. See Complaint at 8, 
Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 1190 (S.D.N.Y filed Feb. 20, 
1997).  The “in-line” links displayed the linked content within a frame on the defendant’s 
web site that covered advertising on the content owners’ sites with advertising from the 
defendant’s own web site. Id.  The complaint relied primarily on the common law 
misappropriation tort and the case was settled on terms that allowed the defendant to link 
to the plaintiffs’ content with non-framing links. Bruce P. Keller, Condemned to Repeat 
the Past: The Reemergence of Misappropriation and Other Common Law Theories of 
Protection for Intellectual Property, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 410, 419–23 (1998).  Content 
owners might argue that even if “in-line” links do not infringe their reproduction, display, 
or distribution rights under the holdings of cases such as Perfect 10, the user has in effect 
created a new version of the copyrighted content in violation of the owner’s exclusive 
right to prepare derivative works under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). See Futuredontics Inc. v. 
Applied Anagramics Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2005, 2006–07 (C.D. Cal.), aff’d, 152 
F.3d 925 (9th Cir. 1998) (declining to dismiss a count alleging violation of the derivative 
right through a framing link).  However, the most appropriate response may have been 
given by Judge Batts in 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. When-U.com, who said that “pop-up” ads 
that covered a portion of the plaintiff’s web site did not “recast, transform or adapt” 
(paraphrasing the definition of “derivative work” in 17 U.S.C. § 101) the plaintiff’s web 
site and thus did not create infringing derivatives works. 309 F. Supp. 2d 467, 487 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
1033 (2005). 
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No court has ruled on the copyrightability of news headlines 
under U.S. law, although one case came tantalizingly close.50  In 
2005, the French news organization Agence France-Presse filed a 
suit claiming that Google’s use of the agency’s headlines, leads, 
and photos on its news aggregation site infringed the agency’s 
copyrights.51  The parties filed cross motions for partial summary 
judgment on the issue of whether the headlines used as links by 
Google were copyrightable subject matter.52  The court heard oral 
arguments on the motions, but the case settled when the parties 
reached a licensing agreement.53 
In support of its summary judgment motion, Google offered 
three reasons why news headlines should not be copyrightable.54  
The first argument rested on the fact that headlines are small 
works—in this case never exceeding ten words, according to the 
plaintiff’s style book.55  Only “original works of authorship” are 
eligible for copyright.56  The Supreme Court has interpreted that 
standard to require “only that the work was independently created 
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.”57  Short 
works like headlines are unlikely to exhibit the requisite 
creativity.58  The regulations of the Copyright Office reflect this 
 
 50 A decision by the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom recently held that 
newspaper headlines could qualify as original literary works and their use as links could 
be an infringement of copyright. Newspaper Licensing Agency v. Meltwater Holding BV 
[2011] EWCA (Civ) 890, [16]. 
 51 First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 28. 
 52 See Michael Warnecke, Copyrights/Infringement: In Battle Over Use of News 
Headlines, Court Focuses on Policy Implications for Web, 71 PAT., TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 269 (2006). 
 53 See Copyright/Infringement: Agence France-Presse, Google Inc. Settle Copyright 
Infringement Dispute, 73 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 706 (2007). 
 54 Google’s Motion and Memorandum for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing 
Count II for Lack of Protectable Subject Matter, Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc., 
No. 1:05 Civ. 00546 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 17, 2005), 2005 WL 3174401. 
 55 See id. 
 56 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006).  
 57 Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 58 See, e.g., Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(phrases such as “Call for help” and “Check breathing” in CPR software are not 
copyrightable); CMM Cable Rep, Inc. v. Ocean Coast Props., Inc. 97 F.3d 1504, 1520 
(1st Cir. 1996) (phrases such as “call in, clock in, and win” not copyrightable); Magic 
Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Serv. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 772 (W.D. Pa. 1986) 
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view, excluding from copyright registration “[w]ords and short 
phrases such as names, titles, and slogans; familiar symbols or 
designs; mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering or 
coloring; mere listing of ingredients or contents.”59 
Admittedly, however, it may be possible for even a “small” 
work to exceed the necessary threshold of creativity, which the 
Supreme Court has characterized as “extremely low.”60  As the 
leading treatise on copyright puts it, “it would seem 
(notwithstanding the above quoted Copyright Office Regulation) 
that even a short phrase may command copyright protection if it 
exhibits sufficient creativity.”61  Thus, especially clever headlines 
might sometimes make the grade, although apparently not those of 
Agence France-Presse, which admitted that its headlines are not 
“hardened” or “jazzed up” to be more eye-catching.62  Even 
creative headlines, however, face other obstacles to protection. 
Google’s memorandum in support of its motion for summary 
judgment also made the point that headlines are factual statements 
about the news.63  Facts are not eligible for copyright protection.64  
Protection is limited to the way the facts are expressed.65  
However, in some circumstances protection for even the literary 
expression of facts may effectively prevent others from 
communicating the underlying information.  As Google put it, the 
law should withhold copyright from expressions of facts when 
necessary “to keep the ‘basic building blocks’ of public discourse 
 
(phrases such as “Priority Message,” “Contents Require Immediate Attention” and “Gift 
Check Enclosed” are not copyrightable); 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 2.7.3 (2d ed. 2011) (“The shorter a phrase is, the less likely it is to be original and the 
more likely it is to constitute an idea rather than an expression.”); 1 MELVIN B. NIMMER 
& DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[B] (“The smaller the effort (e.g., two 
words) the greater must be the degree of creativity in order to claim copyright 
protection.”). 
 59 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010).  
 60 See Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
 61 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, at 9. 
 62 Google’s Motion and Mem., supra note 54, at 2. 
 63 See id. at 3.  
 64 See infra Part II.  
 65 See infra text accompanying note 157. 
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freely available.”66  This is in essence an appeal to the copyright 
doctrine of merger.  As explained by one court: 
Under the copyright law doctrine of merger, a close 
cousin to the idea/expression dichotomy, copyright 
protection will be denied to even some expressions 
of ideas if the idea behind the expression is such 
that it can be expressed only in a very limited 
number of ways.  The doctrine is designed to 
prevent an author from monopolizing an idea 
merely by copyrighting a few expressions of it.67 
If copyright protection were freely extended to headlines, the 
possible non-infringing headline variations for a particular news 
story might well be used up, leaving subsequent writers with no 
choice but to risk infringement of a previously copyrighted 
version.68 
Google offered an additional argument against copyright in 
headlines, even creative ones.  As the Copyright Office regulation 
illustrates, titles have traditionally been excluded from copyright 
protection.69  Agence France-Presse responded that “headlines are 
parts of stories, not identifiers like titles,”70 but the distinction 
between “headlines” and “titles” is unconvincing.  A book or 
movie title is as much a part of that work as a news headline, 
and—more to the point—the headline is often the only practical 
way of identifying a particular news article.  For example, The 
Bluebook citation form for news articles includes the “title”—
 
 66 Google’s Motion and Mem., supra note 54, at 3(a). 
 67 Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986). 
 68 Professor Alfred Yen has drawn a similar conclusion: “Courts would therefore 
probably deny copyright to many headlines under the principle of merger.” Alfred C. 
Yen, A Preliminary First Amendment Analysis of Legislation Treating News Aggregation 
as Copyright Infringement, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 947, 956 (2010). 
 69 See, e.g., 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 58, at 2:101 (“Courts have universally held that 
titles of works are not copyrightable.”); 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.16 (“It is 
nevertheless clear, as a matter of statutory construction by the courts (as well as 
Copyright Office Regulations), that titles may not claim statutory copyright.”).   
 70 Response in Opposition to Google, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 
5, Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 Civ. 00546 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 2005) 
2002WL 3174409 [hereinafter Response in Opposition]. 
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presumably the headline—of the article.71  If headlines—serving as 
titles and distinguishing one news story from another—are 
copyrightable, every subsequent reference to the news story would 
become a prima facie infringement.  A per se rule excluding 
headlines from copyright would also avoid a headline-by-headline 
evaluation of creativity and merger, thus creating a safe harbor for 
headline links. 
Although not included within the scope of the summary 
judgment motions, Agence France-Presse had also complained 
about Google’s use of leads from the agency’s news articles.72  
Lead paragraphs afford more space for the creative intellectual 
effort necessary for copyright,73 thus presenting a stronger case for 
copyright than headlines.  Protection for leads is also less likely to 
present problems of merger since the possible variations in 
expression expand with the increased size of a work.  Perhaps 
more importantly the use of leads, unlike headlines, is not 
necessary to identify a particular news story.  Whether copying all 
or a portion of a lead paragraph is an infringement can only be 
determined case by case.  In one such case, the Second Circuit held 
that copying the first paragraph of a six-paragraph news article did 
not produce the “substantial similarity” necessary for 
infringement.74 
Even if a newspaper succeeds in arguing that the headlines or 
leads copied by an aggregator are copyrighted, it will still likely 
face the inevitable fair use defense.  The extent to which the 
defendant’s use is “transformative” plays a key role in assessing 
“the purpose and character of the use” under the first statutory fair 
use factor.75  Two Ninth Circuit cases involving image search 
 
 71 THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 16.6, at 151 (Columbia Law 
Review Ass’n et al. eds., 19th ed. 2010). 
 72 See Response in Opposition, supra note 70, at 6. 
 73 See generally Melvin Mencher, The Lead, NEWS REPORTING AND WRITING, 
http://www.columbia.edu/itc/journalism/isaacs/client_edit/Mencher.html (last visited Oct. 
25, 2012) (explaining the different ways in which to write a lead).  
 74 See Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 
1999) (“a close call”). 
 75 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (explaining 
that the first fair use factor “asks . . . whether and to what extent the new work is 
‘transformative.’  Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a 
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engines concluded that the use of thumbnail images by search 
engines is a transformative, rather than a superseding, use of the 
original images, since such use serves a different purpose than the 
original expression by transforming the images into pointers that 
assist in accessing information.76  The same could be said about 
headline links.  Newspapers might argue that unlike the low- 
resolution thumbnail images in the search engine cases, the use of 
headlines as links can be a superseding use since the headline may 
be sufficient in itself to satisfy the reader’s desire for information.  
However, characterizing a headline link as a superseding use is 
problematic even when readers choose not to click through to the 
original content.  Rather than using the headline as a substitute for 
the original content, it may be more accurate to say that those 
readers have simply decided that they are not interested in the 
original content. 
The “purpose and character of the use” factor also directs 
courts to consider whether the “use is of a commercial nature.”77  
If money is made by exploiting a copyrighted work, the copyright 
owner has a natural claim to the proceeds.  Many news aggregation 
sites, and even many blogs, are commercial enterprises supported 
by advertising or subscription fees.78  However, unlike traditional 
commercial uses, the exploitation here is more attenuated since the 
linking site is not directly selling copies of the copyrighted 
works.79  In addition, the more transformative the use, the weaker 
the copyright owner’s claim to any proceeds generated by the 
 
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally 
furthered by the creation of transformative works.”) (citations and footnote omitted). 
 76 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818–19 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 77 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
 78 See, e.g., Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818 (“Arriba operates its web site for commercial 
purposes.”).  
 79 See id. (reasoning that although the image search engine’s use was commercial, “it 
was more incidental and less exploitative in nature than more traditional types of use” 
since the defendant “was neither using [plaintiff’s] images to directly promote its web 
site nor trying to profit by selling [plaintiff’s] images”); cf. Am. Geophysical Union v. 
Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 921–22 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995) 
(finding the link between the defendant photocopier’s business profits and the copying 
“somewhat attenuated” and not “commercial exploitation” although acknowledging “at 
least some indirect economic advantage” from the copying). 
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use.80  Both factors may help to neutralize the commercial nature 
of an aggregator’s use.  In the end, the public benefit in improving 
access to information on the Internet may suffice to tilt the balance 
of the first fair use factor toward the defendants.81 
Little is usually made of the second fair use factor—“the nature 
of the copyrighted work”82—unless the work is unpublished or is, 
as in the news context, a factual work.83  The latter circumstance 
typically elicits a statement that the scope of fair use is broader for 
factual works in light of the heightened public interest in 
dissemination.84 
The third factor in section 107—the “amount and substantiality 
of the use”85—includes a qualitative as well as a quantitative 
assessment of the defendant’s use.86  Although headlines and leads 
are quantitatively small, newspapers can be expected to argue that 
they are the heart of a news story and that their reproduction thus 
weighs heavily against a fair use defense.  Courts have held that 
the amount of use, however, should not be evaluated in the 
abstract, but instead in relation to the amount that is necessary to 
effectuate the defendant’s legitimate fair use purposes.87  The use 
 
 80 See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579 (“[T]he more transformative the new work, the less 
will be the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a 
finding of fair use.”); Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1166–67 (finding Google’s transformative 
use of images as thumbnails outweighed the fact that the use was commercial); Kelly, 336 
F.3d at 818.  
 81 See Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1165 (noting the “social benefit” of electronic reference 
tools); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (noting that the use of the thumbnail images “benefit the 
public by enhancing information-gathering techniques on the internet”). 
 82 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 83 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 553–56 (1985). 
 84 See id. at 563 (“The law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual 
works than works of fiction or fantasy.”). 
 85 17 U.S.C. § 107(1). 
 86 See Harper, 471 U.S. at 564–65. 
 87 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586–87 (1994) (“[W]e 
recognize that the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and character of 
the use.”); Chicago Bd. of Ed. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 816 (2004) (“[T]he fair use copier must copy no more than is reasonably 
necessary (not strictly necessary—room must be allowed for judgment, and judges must 
not police criticism with a heavy hand) to enable him to pursue an aim that the law 
recognizes as proper . . . .”); Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820–21 (“[T]he extent of permissible 
copying varies with the purpose and character of the use.  If the secondary user only 
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of headlines seems indispensable to the links that assist users to 
access desired news content.  Leads, however, are less directly 
related to that purpose, and come closer instead to substituting for 
the copyrighted content.  Copying leads may tilt this factor toward 
copyright owners. 
The final fair use factor considers the effect of the use on the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.88  Typically, 
it will be impossible for content owners to tie a decrease in the 
market for print versions of their works to an aggregator’s or 
blogger’s use of headlines or leads taken from the owner’s online 
site.89  Content owners are more likely to claim that the use affects 
revenues related specifically to their online sites, primarily lost 
advertising revenue caused by a drop in traffic to their sites.90 
However, the impact of aggregation on web site traffic is 
unclear.  One study found that 44% of Google News users failed to 
click through to any of the original content after scanning the 
headlines,91 but there was no estimate of how many of those users 
would have otherwise visited the originating sites.  Some of the 
many who did follow links to originating web sites might not have 
otherwise visited those sites.92  Net gains or losses are difficult to 
estimate.93  Some anecdotal evidence suggests that aggregation 
sites and blogs may increase traffic and potential advertising 
revenues for news sites.94  Moreover, there are now technical 
means to prevent search engines and aggregators from 
 
copies as much as is necessary for his or her intended use, then this factor will not weigh 
against him or her.”) (footnote omitted). 
 88 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
89 See Erick Schonfeld, The Media Bundle is Dead, Long Live The News Aggregators, 
(in small caps) TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 16, 2009), http://techcrunch.com/2009/08/16/the-
media-bundle-is-dead-long-live-the-news-aggregators. 
90 See id. 
 91 See Robin Wauters, Report: 44% of Google News Visitors Scan Headlines, Don’t 
Click Through, TechCrunch (Jan. 19, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/01/19/outsell-
google-news (reporting on the research firm Outsell’s News Users’ report). 
 92 See Lesley Chiou & Catherine Tucker, Copyright, Digitization, and Aggregation, 1, 
3 (Dec. 17, 2011), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1864203. 
 93 See id.  
 94 See id. at 2–3. 
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automatically crawling a web site to index or extract its content.95  
The fact that most news sites do not block such web crawling may 
indicate that the sites have at least tentatively concluded that they 
are better off being aggregated than not.96  Similarly, when The 
New York Times announced that it was limiting the number of 
articles that readers could read each month for free on its web site, 
the policy specifically excluded articles reached by readers through 
search engines and other links.97 
Another source of potential economic harm that owners might 
attribute to aggregation and blogging is the loss of revenue from 
licensing those uses of their content.  There is an obvious problem 
with taking lost licensing revenue into account in evaluating fair 
use, since copyright owners can always claim that any 
unauthorized use deprived them of the revenue they would 
otherwise have received for licensing the use.  With that in mind, 
courts have considered lost licensing revenues only when a 
traditional derivative market already exists or is likely to be 
developed and have excluded markets for transformatively 
different uses.98  The lost licensing revenue argument is thus weak 
with respect to the transformative use of headlines as links to the 
news stories that they designate.  The use of leads by aggregators, 
however, is less transformative and less necessary, and a licensing 
market involving content owners and aggregators apparently 
 
 95 Josh Cohen, Working with News Publishers, Google Public Policy Blog (July 15, 
2009, 2:25 PM), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2009/07/working-with-news-
publishers.html; see Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006) 
(referring to expert testimony explaining how a web site publisher can prevent a search 
engine from caching its site). 
 96 The court in Field goes further, concluding that the failure of a web site owner to 
use technical means to prevent search engines from indexing and caching the site 
constitutes an implied license to make such use. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1116. 
 97 Arthur Sulzberger, Jr., A Letter to Our Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2011, at A26. 
(“Readers who come to Times articles through links from search engines, blogs and 
social media will be able to read those articles, even if they have reached their monthly 
reading limit. This allows new and casual readers to continue to discover our content on 
the open Web.”). 
 98 See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 614 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
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already exists.99  On this factor too, the use of leads presents a 
weaker claim to fair use than headlines. 
Thus, even if the use of headlines as links is a prima facie 
infringement, a fair use defense is likely to prevail.  When a 
headline is used to identify a link and not merely to convey its 
factual content, the use seems transformative.  The use involves a 
work of fact and takes no more than necessary to fulfill what seems 
a legitimate fair use purpose, while the economic effect remains 
open to question.  For leads, the closest comparison is not to 
headlines but to the use of excerpts or complete news stories, 
leaving the outcome on fair use to be determined case by case. 
II. COPYRIGHT IN FACTS 
Suppose that an aggregator or blogger reproduces neither the 
text of a news story nor its headline or lead, taking instead only 
facts reported in the article, such as the particular investment rating 
given by a financial analyst to a specific bond or stock.  That 
should not be a problem under copyright law—at least if Congress, 
the United States Supreme Court, and the leading commentators on 
copyright are to be believed.100  But what then should be made of 
 
 99 Chiou & Tucker, supra note 92, at 5.  
 100 Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act prohibits copyright protection for “any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery.” 17 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).  The statutory language was clearly intended to subsume 
information.  “Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or information 
revealed by the author’s work.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670; see Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 547 (1985) (“[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas.  The copyright is limited to 
those aspects of the work—termed ‘expression’—that display the stamp of the author’s 
originality.”) (citation omitted); id. at 556 (“No author may copyright his ideas or the 
facts he narrates.”); Feist Publ’ns., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344 (1991) 
(“That there can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.”); INS, 248 U.S. 
215, 234 (1918) (“It is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they 
empowered Congress ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries’ (Const. art. 1, § 8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to 
be the first to report a historic event the exclusive right for any period to spread the 
knowledge of it.”).  The leading commentators on copyright agree.  “The courts have 
denied copyright protection not only to historical facts, but also to facts set out in 
biographical works, in news stories, and in other forms of expression.” 1 NIMMER, supra 
note 58, § 2.11; “[N]o amount of effort in researching, collecting or producing data will 
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the cryptic remark in Judge Cote’s opinion in Barclays Capital Inc. 
v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., discussing the copyrightability of 
equity research recommendations produced by the plaintiff equity 
firms: 
It is also worth bearing in mind that the 
Recommendations are not objective facts, but 
rather, subjective judgments based on complex and 
imperfect evidence.  In this sense, the 
Recommendations produced by the Firms represent 
the kinds of information to which the Court of 
Appeals has seen fit to extend copyright protection 
under copyright laws.  Such information has been 
described as “soft facts” or “soft ideas infused with 
taste or opinion,” and explicitly includes items such 
as subjective valuations or target prices.101 
This comment acknowledges a major but underappreciated 
threat to the basic tenet of copyright law that individual facts are 
not protected.102  The heresy can be traced to the Second Circuit’s 
opinion in CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter 
Market Reports, Inc.103  That case and its progeny undermine the 
fundamental premise of copyright law that protection extends only 
to the manner in which an author expresses her ideas and 
information but not to the ideas and information themselves.104 
CCC Information was a declaratory judgment action brought 
by the owner of a computer database seeking to establish its 
freedom to copy portions of Maclean’s Automobile Red Book 
(“Red Book”), which contained projected values for various 
 
of itself qualify the results of that effort for copyright protection.” 1 GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 58, § 2.14. 
 101 Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 102 Collections of facts can be protected as compilations if they exhibit sufficient 
creativity in the selection and arrangement of the individual facts. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 103, 
101 (2006) (definition of “compilation”). See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. 
 103 CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc. 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 
1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 817 (1995).  In fact, Judge Cote’s quotation cites to this 
case. See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
 104 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.03 [D]. 
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models of used cars in different geographic markets.105  Maclean 
counterclaimed for copyright infringement.106  Relying on section 
103 of the Copyright Act, which recognizes copyright in 
“compilations,”107 and on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Feist 
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,108 which 
recognized creativity in the selection and arrangement of data, the 
court held that the Red Book as a whole was copyrightable as a 
compilation.109  The court found that “the selection and 
arrangement of data in the Red Book displayed amply sufficient 
originality to pass the low threshold requirement to earn copyright 
protection,”110 referring to the originality in the division of car 
values into separate regional markets, the selection of optional 
vehicle features to consider, the adjustment of values for mileage 
in 5,000 mile increments, and the selection of the model years to 
include in the compilation.111  So far, so good.  But the usually 
sure-handed Judge Leval,112 chastising the district court for 
holding that the Red Book was uncopyrightable, ranged well 
beyond originality in the selection and arrangement of the Red 
Book’s data, drawing a dubious distinction between “discovered” 
facts and estimates or predictions: 
The district court was simply mistaken in its 
conclusion that the Red Book valuations were, like 
the telephone numbers in Feist, pre-existing facts 
that had merely been discovered by the Red Book 
editors.  To the contrary, Maclean’s evidence 
demonstrated without rebuttal that its valuations 
were neither reports of historical prices nor 
mechanical derivations of historical prices or other 
data.  Rather, they represented predictions by Red 
Book editors of future prices estimated to cover 
 
 105 See CCC Info., 44 F.3d. at 67. 
 106 See id. at 64.  
 107 17 U.S.C. § 103. 
 108 Feist, 499 U.S. at 348. 
 109 See CCC Info., 44 F.3d at 72. 
 110 Id. at 67. 
 111 See id.  
 112 See, e.g., Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 
(1990) (arguing against a bright-line standard for fair use). 
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specified geographic regions. . . . The valuations 
themselves are original creations of Maclean.113 
When, in CDN Inc. v. Kapes, the publisher of a newsletter on 
coin prices complained that a coin dealer was using its prices on 
the dealer’s web page, the Ninth Circuit, citing CCC Information, 
enthusiastically and unambiguously fell into line behind the 
Second Circuit.114  Unlike the claim in CCC Information, the 
copyright owner here did not allege infringement of its compilation 
of prices, and thus originality in the selection or arrangement of the 
coin prices was not an issue.115  “Rather, the issue in this case is 
whether the prices themselves are sufficiently original as 
compilations to sustain a copyright.”116  The court held that they 
were.117  In its analysis, the court focused on the subjective process 
of creating a price list, reasoning “[w]hat is important is the fact 
that both Maclean and CDN arrive at the prices they list through a 
process that involves using their judgment to distill and extrapolate 
from factual data.”118 
The defendant also raised a merger argument,  asserting that 
even if the number used to express a coin’s price were 
copyrightable, the idea of the coin’s value can only be expressed 
through the use of that number and barring copying would thus 
impermissibly confer a monopoly over the idea itself.119  As with 
 
 113 CCC Info., 44 F.3d at 67.  Any uncertainty over the implications of the court’s 
comments was removed by a footnote that added, “[o]riginal authorship warranting 
protection” can be fixed in the form of numbers, citing the Copyright Act’s definition of 
“literary works” in 107 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). Id. at 67 n.6.  At least one court had 
preceded the Second Circuit in recognizing copyright in individual valuations.  Marshall 
& Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952 (W.D. Mich. 1994), involved a claim to 
copyright in the values appearing in tables of cost estimates for building construction 
used by appraisers.  Plaintiff argued “that the content of the tables is protectible 
expression because it is opinion; that the numbers in the tables represent an appraisal or 
estimate of value.” Id. at 959.  The court agreed, finding that the plaintiff had “more than 
adequately supported its contention that judgment and selection are components of its 
creative process,” despite “an apparent lack of case precedent affording copyright 
protection to the same type of material.” Id. at 960. 
 114 See CDN Inc., v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 115 See id. at 1259. 
 116 Id. 
 117 See id. at 1262. 
 118 Id. at 1261. 
 119 Id. 
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all merger arguments, the crucial step came in defining the “idea” 
that should remain available to the defendant and the public.120  
The court sided with plaintiff CDN, stating that “CDN does not, 
nor could it, claim protection for its idea of creating a wholesale 
price guide, but it can use the copyright laws to protect its idea of 
what those prices are.”121  Somehow, the coin values were not the 
kind of “facts” that Congress and the Supreme Court had placed 
beyond the reach of copyright. 
Soon after CCC Information and CDN, a young assistant 
professor at the University of Alabama offered a direct and 
forceful refutation of the distinction between “discovered” and so-
called “soft” facts, concluding that the two cases were 
fundamentally inconsistent with Feist’s unambiguous bar to 
copyright in facts.122  Evidently few people listened.  Some years 
later, though, the Second Circuit did make a half-hearted retreat 
from CCC Information in New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. 
Intercontinental Exchange, Inc.,123 calling CCC Information’s 
determination that the individual car prices were copyrightable 
“arguably dicta” since the court had also found that the copyright 
in the Red Book as a compilation had been infringed.124  
Nevertheless, faced with a claim of copyright in the daily 
settlement prices of commodities futures contracts, the court in 
N.Y. Mercantile felt compelled to distinguish the car prices in CCC 
Information.  According to the court, car prices are “created” 
predictions.125  “In contrast, settlement prices can be seen as ‘pre-
existing facts’ about the outside world which are discovered from 
actual market activity.”126  While acknowledging that “it is a 
difficult line to draw,” the majority believed “there is a strong 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 1262. 
 122 See Alan L. Durham, Speaking of the World: Fact, Opinion and the Originality 
Standard of Copyright, 33 ARIZ. ST .L.J. 791, 842–43 (2001); see also Dan L. Burk, 
Method and Madness in Copyright Law, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 587, 598–600 (2007). 
 123 N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 
2007).  
 124 Id. at 115 n.5. 
 125 Id. (finding that the car prices were based on predictions for “average” cars that “did 
not exist”).  
 126 Id.  
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argument that, like the census taker, NYMEX does not ‘author’ the 
settlement prices as the term is used in copyright law.”127  A final 
decision on copyrightability was unnecessary, according to the 
court, since protection would in any event be barred by the merger 
doctrine.128  “It is undisputed that all possible expression takes the 
same form, a number.”129  A prohibition on copying would thus 
effectively protect the idea itself. 
Although attracting little attention, inroads into the 
accessibility of facts under the banner of CCC Information and 
CDN have continued.  In one case, ratings of hospital services 
were protected as “expressions created,” distinguishing the 
“discovered” facts excluded under Feist;130 in another, investment 
recommendations were declared not facts but “original” works 
since they were the product of professional judgment.131  One court 
opined that copyright could be based on creativity “in the 
production of the data compiled,” although it ultimately rested its 
decision on creativity in the selection and arrangement of the 
data.132  Four-digit numbers used to indicate the load ratings of ball 
bearings were excluded from copyright only after a district court 
judge made a factual finding that the amount of “judgment” 
exercised in choosing the factors that determined the ratings was 
“minimal”—in other words, more like the settlement prices in N.Y. 
Mercantile than the car values in CCC Information.133  Another 
recent case fashioned a test for the protectability of “final 
values”—indices of financial market performance—based on the 
 
 127 Id. at 114.  A concurring judge thought the settlement prices were no different than 
used car values and protectable under the standard announced in CCC Information. Id. at 
120 (Hall, J., concurring in part). 
 128 See id. at 116.  
 129 Id. at 118. 
 130 Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 
1226, 1234 (D. Colo. 2009).  See also National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 2012 WL 
6444226 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (scouting grades given to college football players held 
copyrightable).  The ambiguous copyright status of “ratings” is considered in James 
Grimmelmann, Three Theories of Copyright in Ratings, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 851 
(2012).  
 131 Agora Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 503 (D. Md. 2010). 
 132 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236, 1239–40 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
 133 RBC Nice Bearings, Inc. v. Peer Bearing Co., 676 F. Supp. 2d 9, 22–23 (D. Conn. 
2009), aff’d, 410 Fed. Appx. 362 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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Second Circuit’s decisions in CCC Information and N.Y. 
Mercantile.134 
[T]o demonstrate that the final values produced 
from raw data are protectable by copyright, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate either that (1) the raw 
data used to create the final value were protectable; 
or (2) the method of converting the raw data into a 
final value was an original (but not necessarily 
novel) process that is neither widely accepted as 
objective, nor an industry standard; or (3) the final 
value did not attempt to measure an empirical 
reality.135 
We now seem a long way from the basic principle that facts are 
not protected by copyright. 
This extension of copyright into the realm of information rests 
on a faulty distinction between “hard” or “discovered” facts and 
“soft” or “created” ones.  The Supreme Court in Feist explained 
the exclusion of facts by invoking the originality requirement: 
“[F]acts do not owe their origin to an act of authorship.”136  It used 
census data as an example, arguing that census takers “do not 
‘create’ the population figures that emerge from their efforts,” and 
hence their data is not “original” as required for copyright.137  The 
line of cases emanating from CCC Information limits the 
prohibition in Feist to “pre-existing” facts that are “discovered” by 
their presenter, leaving facts that reflect the subjective judgment of 
a creator, like the estimated values of used cars or coins, within the 
scope of copyright protection.138 
 
 134 BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 135 Id. at 604–05. 
 136 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 347 (1991). 
 137 Id. at 347. 
 138 I may bear some responsibility for this development.  The census data example used 
by the Supreme Court to explain the exclusion of facts from copyright was taken from an 
article I published in the Columbia Law Review. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in 
Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 516, 525 (1981).  The example was not intended to distinguish among 
kinds of facts, “hard,” “soft,” or otherwise.  There is no indication in Feist that the 
Supreme Court understood the example in the narrow sense adopted by the cases 
distinguishing “hard” and “soft” facts. 
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The distinction between “discovered” and “created” facts 
seems wrong for at least two reasons.  First, even the census data 
invoked in Feist is the product of subjective and creative choices.  
For example, should summer residents or students at the local 
college be included in a town’s population?  What of 
undocumented immigrants, or military personnel living at the local 
air base?  How should we deal with persons who are born or die or 
move in or out of town during the course of the counting period?139  
Judge Easterbrook sensibly opined that Einstein’s E=mc2 expresses 
a fact and is thus not copyrightable,140 but even that apparently 
“hard” and “discovered” fact is actually an interpretation of 
observed events that may, like Newton’s F=ma, prove to be only a 
brilliant estimate of some deeper reality.  The census data excluded 
from copyright in Feist is not different in any fundamental way 
from the car or coin prices, hospital ratings, or investment 
recommendations protected in more recent cases. 
Reliance on a distinction between “discovered” and “created” 
facts also seems flawed in another way.  In most of the “created” 
fact cases, the defendants were interested in disseminating not 
simply a price, or rating, or recommendation, but rather the fact 
that the plaintiff had calculated or awarded that price, rating, or 
recommendation.  In other words, the relevant fact is not that a 
particular used car is worth $5,000, or that a hospital has a three-
star pediatrics unit, or that a stock is now rated as “buy.”  The facts 
that the defendants sought to disseminate were the fact that the 
plaintiff’s Red Book lists a car’s value at $5,000, the fact that the 
Health Grades rating service gave the pediatrics unit a three-star 
rating, and the fact that Barclays Capital rates a certain stock as 
“buy.”  Viewed in this light, the relevant facts are at least as “hard” 
and “discoverable” as any census data.  The estimates or ratings 
themselves may seem “soft,” but the fact that the plaintiff assigned 
that particular estimate or rating is “hard” and “discoverable.” 
A distinction between “hard” and “soft” facts is also not itself 
sufficient to secure copyright for the latter “works.”  As with any 
work, “soft” facts must still satisfy the statutory prerequisites for 
 
 139 See Durham, supra note 122, at 838–39. 
 140 Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979 (7th Cir. 1997). 
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copyright—fixation, independent creation, and sufficient creativity 
to constitute a work of authorship—the latter two requirements 
subsumed in Feist under the label of “originality.”141  Neither 
fixation in a tangible form nor independent creation is typically at 
issue in the “soft” fact cases.  The problematic hurdle is 
“creativity.”  The “works” at issue, after all, are short phrases like 
“Exxon/Mobil—Buy” or “Plains General Pediatrics—3 Stars” or 
“Fine 1895 Barber Dime—$205.”  On their face, these “works” 
seem to fall short of even the “minimal level of creativity” 
demanded by the Supreme Court in Feist. 
The “soft” fact cases, however, find the requisite creativity not 
in the expression of the information, but rather in the process that 
generated it.  The Ninth Circuit in CDN, for example, found that 
the “process” used by the plaintiff to generate the coin values 
“satisfies the ‘minimal degree of creativity’ demanded by the 
Constitution for copyright protection.”142  Similarly, health 
services ratings were held copyrightable as “the product of a 
creative and original process.”143  Another court suggested that 
“copyright . . . may be afforded compilations if there is a minimum 
level of creativity, either in the production of the data compiled or 
in the selection and arrangement.”144 
There is a straightforward rebuttal to this line of reasoning.  
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act specifically excludes from 
copyright any “idea, procedure, process, system, [or] method of 
operation,” presumably even creative ones.145  Copyright 
 
 141 “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was 
independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it 
possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (citing 1 
NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.01 [A], [B]). 
 142 CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1999).  The court in CCC 
Information looked to the “multitude of data sources” and the “professional judgment and 
expertise” in concluding that the used car “valuations themselves are original creations of 
[plaintiff].” CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 
(2d Cir. 1994). 
 143 Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 2d 
1226, 1235 (D. Colo. 2009).  See also National Football Scouting, Inc. v. Rang, 2012 WL 
6444226 (W.D. Wash. 2012) (scouting grades for college football players held 
copyrightable as reflecting a creative weighing of subjective factors). 
 144 Jacobsen v. Katzer, 93 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1236, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 145 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006). 
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protection for “soft” facts thus cannot rest on creativity in the 
procedure, process, system, or method used to produce them.146  
Several courts have recognized this.  The Sixth Circuit in ATC 
Distribution Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & 
Parts, Inc.,147 a case about copying numbers used for transmission 
parts, held that the parts classification system created by the 
plaintiff was not copyrightable despite its creativity.148  Citing the 
bar to copyright for ideas in section 102(b), the court said that the 
scheme could not be protected,149 because “all of the creative 
aspects of the [plaintiff’s] classification scheme are just that: 
ideas.”150 
The Third Circuit’s en banc decision in Southco, Inc. v. 
Kanebridge Corp.151 similarly held that a numbering system for 
fasteners was not subject to copyright.152  “[B]ecause ideas may 
not be copyrighted, [plaintiff] does not assert any claim of 
copyright in its numbering system, but instead focuses on the part 
numbers themselves.”153  Copyright must rest on the attributes of 
the generated expression itself, not on the attributes of the system 
or process responsible for that expression.  E=mc2 is the product of 
remarkable creativity, but it is not copyrightable.  Protection for 
the underlying idea is barred by section 102(b) and protection for 
the formula itself as an expression of that idea is not available 
because, unlike a textual description of special relativity, the 
formula lacks the minimum level of creative expression required 
for copyright.154 
There is yet another objection to recognizing copyright in 
output based on creativity in the production process.  Users who 
 
 146 See Burk, supra note 122, at 598–600; Durham, supra note 122, at 807–08. 
 147 402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 148 See id. at 710–12. 
 149 Id. at 707. 
 150 Id. 
 151 390 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 813 (2005). 
 152 See id. at 282 
 153 Id. 
 154 Even if the equation’s expression satisfied the required standard of creativity, 
protection would almost certainly be barred by the merger doctrine since copyright in the 
equation would effectively prevent access to the underlying idea. See infra text 
accompanying notes 171–73. 
C02_DENICOLA (DO NOT DELETE) 1/5/2013  2:17 PM 
2012] NEWS ON THE INTERNET 95 
have access only to the resulting data cannot make an informed 
judgment about its protectability.  The expression they see may 
seem too minimal to merit copyright, but, unable to judge the 
creativity of the underlying process, they cannot evaluate the 
likelihood or reasonableness of an assertion of copyright.  The 
situation seems roughly analogous to the line of cases that denies 
copyright protection to fictional material that the author has 
presented as fact.155  The public interest in access to facts cautions 
against requiring users to guess as to the legal status of the 
information.156 
The Supreme Court reiterated in Feist that an “author can claim 
originality, if at all, only in the way the facts are presented.”157  
How do the claims of copyright in the “soft” facts cases fare when 
attention is focused not on the process that produced the data, but 
on the manner in which the results are expressed?  The short 
phrases used to express car or coin values, investment 
recommendations, or health service ratings are almost certainly too 
trivial to reach the level of creativity required for copyright.158  The 
creativity involved in crafting such small works presumably falls 
short of even the “minimal degree of creativity” demanded by 
Feist.159  After refusing to recognize copyright in the systems that 
produced the plaintiffs’ parts numbers, both ATC Distribution 
Group and Southco held that the numbers themselves did not 
exhibit sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection.160  The 
latter case made the point that since the parts numbers were 
dictated by the plaintiff’s numbering system, the numbers 
 
 155 See, e.g., Mosley v. Follett, 209 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1109 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Oliver v. 
Saint Germain Found., 41 F. Supp. 296 (S.D. Cal. 1941).  Oliver is an odd case, even for 
California.  The defendant was permitted to appropriate material from a copyrighted 
work because it had been represented by the plaintiff as the revelations of a deceased 
entity from another world. Id. at 299. 
 156 See Arica Inst., Inc. v. Palmer, 970 F.2d 1067, 1075 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that 
plaintiff was estopped from claiming copyright in material represented as fact, even if 
reasonable readers might not believe the representation). 
 157 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991). 
 158 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (2010), quoted in text accompanying note 59 supra. 
 159 See cases cited supra note 58. 
 160 ATC Distribution Grp., Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmission & Parts, Inc., 402 
F.3d 700, 709 (6th Cir. 2005); Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge, Corp., 390 F.3d 276, 282 (3d 
Cir. 2004). 
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themselves reflected no creativity at all.161  Both opinions also 
alluded to another reason for caution in recognizing copyright in 
“small” works.162  Copyright in works like numbers, words, or 
short phrases imposes costs on subsequent users, who, if 
threatened, may have to bear the costs and risks of proving 
independent creation or fair use. 
One “soft” fact case involving health services ratings 
specifically rejected a defense premised on the Copyright Office 
regulation excluding copyright in “words and short phrases,” 
arguing that copyrightable expression should not be denied 
protection merely because it consists of a short phrase.163  As a 
general proposition, the statement has merit,164 but as the primary 
treatise on copyright law cautions, “[t]he smaller the effort (e.g., 
two words) the greater must be the degree of creativity in order to 
claim copyright protection.”165  However, the only “originality” 
cited by the court to support protection for the health service 
ratings was the creativity of the process that produced them.166  
The manner in which the ratings were expressed seems both trivial 
and, perhaps more importantly, dictated by the ratings process 
itself. 
There is yet another objection to copyright in “soft” facts.  
Even if the expression of the fact somehow achieves the minimum 
standard of creativity necessary for copyright, protection will 
almost always be barred by the merger doctrine.  Ho v. Taflove167 
is an excellent example.  A professor claimed infringement of the 
copyright in notes relating to a model of electron behavior.168  The 
Seventh Circuit held that the model itself was an idea and thus not 
subject to copyright.169  As for the expression of the idea in an 
equation, figures, and text, the court invoked the merger 
 
 161 See Southco, 390 F.3d at 282. 
 162 See Distribution Group, 402 F.3d at 709; Southco, 390 F.3d at 286. 
 163 Health Grades, Inc. v. Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc. 634 F. Supp. 2d 
1226, 1238 (D. Colo. 2009). 
 164 See 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 2.01 [B]. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Health Grades, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 1235. 
 167 648 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 168 See id. at 494. 
 169 Id. at 498. 
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doctrine.170  “Under the merger doctrine, when ‘there is only one 
feasible way of expressing an idea, so that if the expression were 
copyrightable it would mean that the idea was copyrightable,’ the 
expression is not protected.”171  The court concluded that “the 
equation, figures and text are the only ways to express this idea, 
and so, under the merger doctrine, these expressions are not 
copyrightable.”172  Thus, even when the expression used to 
communicate the outcomes claimed as “soft” facts exhibits the 
creativity necessary for copyright, protection will still be 
inappropriate whenever there is no other way to convey the 
information.173 
An incentive rationale is sometimes invoked to justify 
protection for “soft” facts.  The Second Circuit in CCC 
Information, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 
expressed a general concern that without financial incentives, 
creators “might direct their energies elsewhere.”174  In a later case, 
the same court supported its refusal to recognize copyright in the 
settlement prices of commodities futures contracts by noting that 
since the plaintiff was required to establish settlement prices by 
law and business necessity, there was no need for the additional 
incentive of copyright.175  Professor Justin Hughes has offered a 
detailed justification for copyright in certain “created” or 
“authored” facts premised on a desire to insure sufficient incentive 
for their production.176  He distinguishes the settlement prices in 
N.Y. Mercantile and the parts numbers in Southco from the car and 
coin prices in CCC Information and CDN, justifying copyright 
protection in the latter cases as a means to promote creation of the 
works.177  Although perhaps sound policy, this approach is 
 
 170 See id. at 499.  
 171 Id. at 497 (quoting Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash Baptie & Co., LLP, 329 F.3d 923, 928 
(7th Cir. 2003)). 
 172 Id. at 497. 
 173 See, e.g., N.Y. Mercantile Exch., Inc. v. Intercontinental Exch., Inc., 497 F.3d 109, 
118 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991)), 
cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1259 (2008). 
 174 44 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 175 See N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 497 F.3d at 118.  
 176 See Justin Hughes, Created Facts and the Flawed Ontology of Copyright Law, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 43, 108 (2007). 
 177 Id. at 105. 
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inconsistent with the basic structure of the Copyright Act.  
Analogous incentive-based arguments could be offered to justify 
protection for all facts—we might get more of them if they were 
copyrightable.  The store of good ideas might similarly increase if 
they too were offered the incentive of copyright.178  The Copyright 
Act, however, is not a general prohibition against appropriation.179  
It is an intricate balance of incentive and access, and facts are 
explicitly placed beyond its reach. 
Facts, “soft” or otherwise, should not be protected by 
copyright.  The informational content should be available to all.  
The expression used to communicate individual facts is protectable 
only to the extent that the expression itself, divorced from the 
process that generated the fact, satisfies the prerequisites for 
copyright.  A short statement or number will almost never exhibit 
the requisite creativity.  Even when it does, that expression is 
typically the only way to communicate the underlying information 
and protection should be barred by the merger doctrine. 
Unfortunately, there is a theory other than copyright aimed 
more directly at the protection of facts—a discredited common law 
doctrine with a checkered history extending back almost a century.  
Barclays Capital and other recent cases have sought to resurrect it 
as a means of controlling facts on the Internet.  That threat may far 
exceed the potential harm of the “soft” fact copyright cases. 
III. MISAPPROPRIATION 
A.  The “Hot News” Tort 
When Barclays Capital, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and 
other giant equity firms sued Theflyonthewall.com (“Fly”) for 
distributing the firms’ securities recommendations (obtained by 
Fly from mainstream media reports, individual traders, and 
 
 178 Durham, supra note 122, at 828–29. 
 179 “It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler’s labor may be used by 
others without compensation.  As Justice Brennan has correctly observed, however, this 
is not ‘some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme.’  It is, rather, ‘the essence of 
copyright,’ and a constitutional requirement.” Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 
499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (citation omitted). 
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insiders) on its online subscription newsfeed,180 copyright played 
only a minor role.  Fly had already stopped reproducing excerpts 
from the firms’ research reports, and at trial Fly did not contest its 
liability for previous infringements.181  Instead the firms mainly 
relied on New York’s common law tort of misappropriation, a 
doctrine invariably traced to the United States Supreme Court’s 
1918 federal common law decision in International News Service 
v. Associated Press.182  Every student of intellectual property law 
can recite the facts from memory.  The Associated Press (“AP”) 
operated a large and expensive news reporting network in Europe 
during World War I, providing stories about the war to its 950 
member newspapers, which financed AP’s news-gathering efforts 
through their membership fees.183  International News Services 
(“INS”) (which had been denied the use of British transmission 
facilities by the Allies for alleged censorship violations),184 took to 
copying the war news from early east coast editions of AP 
newspapers and transmitting rewritten stories to some 400 INS 
papers around the country.185  AP sought an injunction against this 
“unfair competition.”186  The district court, although enjoining INS 
from inducing AP newspapers and their employees to provide the 
news to INS prior to publication, deferred to the appellate court on 
the issue of copying news from publicly available AP 
newspapers.187  The Circuit Court of Appeals directed the trial 
court to issue a broader injunction barring INS from appropriating 
the substance of AP’s news until its commercial value had 
passed.188  The injunction was affirmed by the Supreme Court189 in 
 
 180 See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 181 See id. at 328. 
 182 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 183 See id. at 229. 
 184 See International News Barred from Britain: New York Agency is Accused of 
“Padding” Cablegrams from London, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1916, at 11, quoted in 
EDMUND W. KITCH & HaRVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION 20–21 (5th ed. 1998). 
 185 See INS, 248 U.S. at 238, 249.  
 186 Id. at 215. 
 187 Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 240 F. 983, 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), modified, 
245 F. 244 (C.C.A.2 1917), aff’d, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
 188 Associated Press v. Int’l News Serv., 245 F. 244, 253 (C.C.A.2 1917), aff’d, 248 
U.S. 215 (1918). 
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an opinion characterized by the district court in Barclays as 
“strongly influenced by several policy ideals: a ‘sweat-of-the-
brow’ or ‘labor’ theory of property; norms of commercial morality 
and fair dealing; and a utilitarian desire to preserve incentives to 
produce socially useful services.”190 
Noting that the INS rationale had been adopted “most 
enthusiastically in New York,”191 Judge Cote turned to the 
dominant precedent on New York misappropriation law—the 
Second Circuit’s decision in National Basketball Association v. 
Motorola, Inc.192  There, the NBA had sued the manufacturer of a 
hand-held pager that displayed real time information on NBA 
 
 189  INS, 248 U.S. at 215 
 190 Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 
2011).  Judge Cote’s discussion of INS included the following quotation from the 
Supreme Court’s opinion: 
The fault in the reasoning [of defendant] lies in applying as a test the 
right of the complainant as against the public, instead of considering 
the rights of complainant and defendant, competitors in business, as 
between themselves.  The right of the purchaser of a single 
newspaper to spread knowledge of its contents gratuitously, for any 
legitimate purpose not unreasonably interfering with complainant’s 
right to make merchandise of it, may be admitted; but to transmit that 
news for commercial use, in competition with complainant—which is 
what defendant has done and seeks to justify—is a very different 
matter.  In doing this defendant, by its very act, admits that it is 
taking material that has been acquired by complainant as the result of 
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money, and 
which is salable by complainant for money, and that defendant in 
appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to reap where 
it has not sown, and by disposing of it to newspapers that are 
competitors of complainant’s members is appropriating to itself the 
harvest of those who have sown.  Stripped of all disguises, the 
process amounts to an unauthorized interference with the normal 
operation of complainant’s legitimate business precisely at the point 
where the profit is to be reaped, in order to divert a material portion 
of the profit from those who have earned it to those who have not; 
with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of the 
fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of gathering 
the news.  The transaction speaks for itself and a court of equity 
ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair competition in 
business. 
Id. at 331–32 (citing INS, 248 U.S. at 239–40.). 
 191 Id. at 332. 
 192 See id. 
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basketball games.193  The game statistics were gathered by 
defendants’ employees from radio and television broadcasts of the 
games and relayed to a central computer for transmission to the 
defendants’ customers.194  The district court had issued a 
permanent injunction based on a misappropriation cause of 
action.195  On appeal, the Second Circuit said that the central issue 
was whether the NBA’s misappropriation claim was preempted by 
federal copyright law—more on that issue later.196  In language 
subsequently quoted by the district court in Barclays,197 the court 
proceeded to list the elements of a state misappropriation claim 
that could co-exist with federal copyright law: 
(i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a 
cost; (ii) the information is time-sensitive; (iii) a 
defendant’s use of the information constitutes free 
riding on the plaintiff’s efforts; (iv) the defendant is 
in direct competition with a product or service 
offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability of other 
parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or 
others would so reduce the incentive to produce the 
product or service that its existence or quality would 
be substantially threatened.198 
The Second Circuit vacated the injunction against Motorola, 
finding that the NBA had failed to establish sufficient competitive 
injury to its primary business of producing live basketball games 
and licensing game broadcasts.199  With respect to potential 
competition with the NBA’s own plans for real time distribution of 
game information, the court said the defendant was not free riding 
 
 193 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc. (NBA), 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 194 See id. at 844.  
 195 Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 
1071, 1086 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated sub nom, NBA, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).  The 
defendants also made the game information available on an AOL online site, and the 
district court included that site within its permanent injunction, resulting in one of the 
first, if temporary, victories against misappropriation on the internet. 
 196 NBA, 105 F.3d at 853. 
 197 See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 198 Id. at 845. 
 199 See id. at 841. 
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since it expended its own resources to collect the information that 
it distributed.200 
Judge Cote in Barclays held that the equity firms had satisfied 
all the necessary NBA elements for a valid misappropriation 
claim.201  Fly did not contest that the plaintiffs incurred substantial 
expense in generating their equity recommendations and that the 
information was time-sensitive.202  On the issue of free riding, 
Judge Cote found that “Fly’s business is its free-riding off the 
sustained, costly efforts” of the plaintiffs to generate research 
highly valued by investors, rejecting Fly’s arguments that its own 
aggregation efforts mitigated the appropriation and that since the 
information had been obtained from third-party sources, it was 
“free for the taking.”203  The direct competition requirement was 
more controversial.  Fly argued that it was in the news business 
and did not provide brokerage services, which was the plaintiffs’ 
primary business.204  The court took a broad view of the direct 
competition requirement. 
While it may be true that Fly is a news aggregator 
and is in direct competition with other financial 
news aggregators, both large and small, each of 
these news aggregators is in direct competition with 
the Firms when they report the Firms’ 
Recommendations in a timely and systematic 
manner such that the Firms are deprived of the 
opportunity to communicate them first-hand to their 
clients.205 
Based on the testimony of the plaintiffs’ own research 
executives, Judge Cote also found that the plaintiffs had 
established that the conduct by Fly and similar aggregators 
substantially threatened the continued viability of the plaintiffs’ 
research operations.206  Fly was enjoined from disseminating the 
 
 200 See id. at 854. 
 201 See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 335–43. 
 202 See id. at 335.  
 203 Id. at 336–37. 
 204 See id. at 339–40. 
 205 Id. at 340. 
 206 See id. at 350, 341. 
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plaintiffs’ equity recommendations until two hours after their 
release, or in the case of recommendations released after the close 
of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, until half an hour 
after the re-opening of trading.207 
Fly appealed the decision on misappropriation to the Second 
Circuit, which had already stayed the injunction.208  After a close 
parsing of its earlier opinion in NBA, the Second Circuit held that 
the five-element test relied on by Judge Cote was dicta: “[T]he 
Court in NBA was opining about the hypothetical set of 
circumstances—not present in that case—that might give rise to [a 
non-preempted INS-like ‘hot news’] claim.”209  Distinguishing 
INS, Judge Sack for the majority held that Barclays’ 
misappropriation claim failed because Fly was not free riding as 
understood in INS.210  “In pressing a ‘hot news’ claim against Fly, 
the Firms seek only to protect their Recommendations, something 
they create using their expertise and experience rather than acquire 
through efforts akin to reporting.”211  The case turned on a 
distinction between making and reporting the news.  “The Firms 
are making the news; Fly, despite the Firm’s understandable desire 
to protect their business model, is breaking it.”212  The point was 
reiterated at the conclusion of the court’s opinion: “We conclude 
that in this case, a Firm’s ability to make news—by issuing a 
Recommendation that is likely to affect the market price of a 
security—does not give rise to a right for it to control who breaks 
that news and how.”213 
Barclays and its distinction between making and breaking the 
news leaves open the door to claims of misappropriation on the 
 
 207 See id. at 347. 
 208 See Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 209 Id. at 899 n.32. 
 210 See id. at 902. 
 211 Id. at 903 (emphasis omitted).  Also, unlike INS, Fly did not divert a significant 
portion of the plaintiffs’ profits to itself. See id. at 904–05. 
 212 Id. at 902.   
 213 Id. at 907.  Judge Raggi, concurring, disputed the majority’s position that the five-
element test in NBA was dicta, but concluded that the misappropriation claim against Fly 
failed that standard too because the parties were not in “direct competition.” See id. at 
911–15 (Raggi, J., concurring).  The “created” facts held by the majority to be beyond the 
reach of the misappropriation tort are of course precisely the kind of facts targeted by 
efforts to expand the scope of copyright protection. See supra Part II.   
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Internet between rivals more clearly in the business of reporting 
the news.  The Second Circuit acknowledged as much in an effort 
to underscore the limits of its holding. 
If a Firm were to collect and disseminate to some 
portion of the public facts about securities 
recommendations in the brokerage industry 
(including, perhaps, such facts it generated itself—
its own Recommendations), and were Fly to copy 
the facts contained in the Firm’s hypothetical 
service, it might be liable to the Firm on a ‘hot-
news’ misappropriation theory.214 
The scope of permissible misappropriation claims expanded 
further when the majority responded  to the concern expressed in 
Judge Raggi’s concurrence that the decision “foreclose[d] the 
possibility of a ‘hot news’ claim by a party who disseminates news 
it happens to create.”215  Declining to endorse even that limitation, 
the majority said, “[t]hat issue is simply not before us. We 
therefore do not address it, let alone suggest or imply that such a 
claim would necessarily be foreclosed.”216 
Given the facts of INS, it is not surprising that subsequent 
plaintiffs have had success protecting their news from 
appropriation by “old” media rivals.217  Now the push is to extend 
that success into digital media.  Although plaintiffs have yet to 
achieve a major precedent establishing the misappropriation tort on 
 
 214 Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 905–06.  The court had made an analogous concession in 
NBA, opining that if some future defendant collected facts from an NBA pager and 
transmitted them to its own product, the NBA might well have a claim for 
misappropriation.  NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 854 (2d Cir. 1997).  
 215 Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 913 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
 216 Id. at 906 n.40. 
 217 See, e.g., McCord Co. v. Plotnick, 239 P.2d 32, 33–34 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); 
Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Pub. Co., 25 A.D.2d 158, 159 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966); 
Pottstown Daily News Pub. Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co., 192 A.2d 657, 663 (Pa. 1963); 
Gilmore v. Sammons, 269. S.W. 861, 862–63 (Tex. App. 1925).  But see Gannett 
Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Rock Valley Cmty. Press, Inc., 1994 WL 606171, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that plaintiff’s news stories were not “hot news”); Scranton 
Times, LP v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269, 1275 (M.D. Pa. 2009) 
(holding that plaintiff failed to show threat to incentive).  
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the Internet, they have become adept at avoiding dismissals and 
extracting settlements.218 
Ninety years after securing relief against INS, AP filed suit 
against All Headline News, which was rewriting AP news content 
taken from the Internet and distributing it to its own paying web 
clients.219  AP’s complaint alleged copyright and trademark 
infringement along with other claims—including common law 
misappropriation.220  AHN moved to dismiss all but the copyright 
claim.221  After holding that New York law governed AP’s 
misappropriation claim, Judge Castel denied the motion to dismiss, 
finding that AP’s complaint set out the five elements required 
under NBA for a valid misappropriation claim.222  The case was 
later settled.223  According to a joint press release on the 
settlement, AP apparently insisted on the following admission: 
“Defendants further acknowledge the tort of ‘hot news 
misappropriation’ has been upheld by other courts and was ruled 
applicable in this case by U.S. District Court Judge P. Kevin 
Castel.”224  All Headline News was cited by the Second Circuit in 
Barclays as an example of facts that might support a valid 
misappropriation claim.225 
Agence France-Presse’s lawsuit against Google for copying its 
headlines and leads,226 which was settled when Google agreed to a 
 
 218 See, e.g., infra notes 219–32 and accompanying text. 
 219 Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) 
 220 Id. at 457 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. at 460–61.  
 223 Amanda Ernst, AP Settles “Hot News” Lawsuit With AHN Media, 
MEDIABISTRO.COM (July 13, 2009, 3:50 PM), http://www.mediabistro.com/fishbowlny/ 
ap-settles-hot-news-lawsuit-with-ahn-media_b12121. 
 224 Id.  AP had previously settled another lawsuit alleging copyright infringement and 
“hot news” misappropriation against an internet distributor of AP news in Associated 
Press v. Moreover Techs, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 8699 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 9, 2007). AP Settles 
Lawsuit Against Moreover and VeriSign, WEBWIRE.COM (Aug. 18, 2008), 
http://www.webwire.com/ViewPressRel.asp?aId=72638. 
 225 Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 897 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 226 Complaint for Preliminary and Permanent Injunction and Copyright Infringement, 
Agence France-Presse v. Google Inc., No. 1:05 Civ. 00546 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 17, 2005). 
See supra text accompanying notes 51–74. 
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license, also included a claim for “hot news” misappropriation.227  
More recently, Dow Jones extracted a settlement from a defendant 
who distributed “hot news” from Dow Jones Newswire as part of 
its live market coverage.228  A more troubling settlement resulted 
from one of the first claims of misappropriation on the Internet.  In 
1997, the Washington Post and other media companies sued Total 
News for operating a website that provided framed links to the 
plaintiffs’ news content.229  The plaintiffs’ copyright infringement 
claim was problematic.230  According to an attorney for the 
plaintiffs, “[t]he Total News plaintiffs, however, did not rely 
solely, or even principally, on a copyright infringement theory.  
Instead, they led their complaint with a misappropriation cause of 
action (among other common law claims).”231  The settlement 
precluded the defendant from providing access to the plaintiffs’ 
content through framed links and purported to grant a revocable 
license for other links labeled only with the Internet address of the 
linked content.232 
Several other cases have refused to dismiss claims directed at 
the misappropriation of online content.  A federal district court in 
New York denied a motion to dismiss a misappropriation count 
directed against a defendant who redistributed the plaintiff’s online 
financial content in breach of a licensing agreement.233  The court 
held that the plaintiff had pled the required NBA elements.234  Two 
federal courts in California also relied on the Second Circuit’s 
analysis in NBA to deny motions to dismiss misappropriation 
claims.  In one of the cases, a plaintiff’s attempt to use the cause of 
 
 227 First Amended Complaint, supra note 9, at 84–93. 
 228 See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Dow Jones & Co. v. Briefing.com, Inc., 
No. 10 Civ. 03321 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 20, 2010), 2010 WL 1679693; Jonathan Stempel, 
Dow Jones, Briefing.com Settle “HotNews” Lawsuit, REUTERS.COM (Nov. 16, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE6AF37G20101116. 
 229 Complaint, Washington Post Co. v. Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 01190 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Feb. 20, 1997), 1997 WL 33633041. 
 230 See supra note 49. 
 231 See Keller, supra note 49, at 422. 
 232 Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal at 3, Washington Post Co. v. 
Total News, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 01190 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 20, 1997), available at 
http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/claw/WPvTNsettl.htm.  
 233 BanxCorp. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. Supp. 2d 596, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 234 Id. at 612–13.  
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action to prevent the use of its celebrity photos by an Internet 
blogger survived a motion to dismiss when the court found that the 
misappropriation tort had been adopted in California and the 
plaintiff’s complaint satisfied NBA.235  In the other, the court found 
that a complaint alleging that a competitor had misappropriated 
concert information from the plaintiff’s website met the pleading 
requirements of NBA.236  Similar claims continue to appear.237 
B.  “Hot News” on the Internet 
A recent series of student-authored Notes and Comments 
enthusiastically supports the recognition of a common law right 
against misappropriation of online content as a way to save the 
newspaper industry.238  Even the staff of the Federal Trade 
Commission has wondered whether a cause of action for 
misappropriation might solve the challenges of modern 
 
 235 X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1103 (C.D. Cal. 2007). 
 236 Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 2000 WL 34016436, at *6 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
 237 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Holdings Inc., No. 12 
Civ. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 14, 2012), 2012 WL 467643. 
 238 See Dennis S. Park, Note, The Associated Press v. All Headline News: How Hot 
News Misappropriation Will Shape the Unsettled Customary Practices of Online 
Journalism, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 369, 393 (2010); Elaine Stoll, Comment, Hot News 
Misappropriation: More Than Nine Decades After INS v. Associated Press, Still an 
Important Remedy for News Piracy, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 1239, 1280–81 (2011); Brian 
Westley, Comment, How a Narrow Application of “Hot News” Misappropriation Can 
Help Save Journalism, 60 AM. U .L. REV. 691, 715 (2011); see also Heather Richtarcsik, 
Note, Misappropriation in Massachusetts and Around the Country: How Technology Will 
Utilize This Tort, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 717, 723 (2001).  Several other student authors 
advocate a codification of the misappropriation tort. See, e.g., Lauren M. Gregory, Note, 
Hot Off the Presses: How Traditional Newspaper Journalism Can Help Reinvent the 
“Hot News” Misappropriation Tort in the Internet Age, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 577, 
611 (2011); Amy E. Jensen, Comment, When News Doesn’t Want to Be Free: Rethinking 
“Hot News” to Help Counter Free Riding on Newspaper Content Online, 60 EMORY L.J. 
537, 569 (2010); Jenna Moon, Note, The “Hot News” Misappropriation Doctrine, the 
Crumbling Newspaper Industry, and Fair Use as Friend and Foe: What is Necessary to 
Preserve “Hot News,” 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 631, 660 (2011). But see Heather 
Sherrod, Comment, The “Hot News” Doctrine: It’s Not 1918 Anymore—Why the “Hot 
News” Doctrine Shouldn’t Be Used to Save the Newspapers, 48 HOUS. L.REV. 1205, 
1239–40 (2012) (concluding that the misappropriation doctrine as applied to news is 
inconsistent with the objectives of copyright law). 
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journalism.239  Yet the common law tort of misappropriation seems 
a particularly unsuitable tool to regulate the distribution of news on 
the Internet.  As an initial matter, leaving national Internet and 
media policy to be determined by common law rules adopted in a 
handful of states is not a recipe for certainty or stability.240  A 
generous count still lists less than a third of the states as 
recognizing the misappropriation tort.241  Another count lists only 
five “hot news” states.242  But even that small number overstates 
the relevant consensus, since as a practical matter the concentration 
of the media and financial industries in New York leaves that 
single jurisdiction in a position to shape the contours of 
information protection on the Internet.  In Associated Press v. All 
Headline News Corp.,243 for example, the defendant argued that 
Florida law, which may not recognize the misappropriation tort, 
should govern the “hot news” claim since its editors and web 
servers were located there.244  Applying New York’s choice-of-law 
rules as the forum state, the court said that New York law 
governed since AP is headquartered in New York and hence 
suffered its alleged injury there.245  New York media and financial 
plaintiffs will usually have little difficulty in making New York the 
forum state in light of interpretations of the state’s long-arm 
 
 239 See FTC STAFF, DISCUSSION DRAFT: POTENTIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO 
SUPPORT THE REINVENTION OF JOURNALISM 1, 5–8 (2010), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/jun15/docs/new-staff-discussion.pdf. 
 240 The Second Circuit in Barclays noted this problem.  “To the extent that ‘hot news’ 
misappropriation causes of action are not preempted, the aggregators’ actions may have 
different legal significance from state to state—permitted, at least to some extent, in 
some; prohibited, at least to some extent, in others.” Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 897–98 
(2d Cir. 2011). 
 241 See Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation Is Seventy-Five Years Old: Should We Bury 
It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781, 801–02 (1994) (listing fourteen states as having 
adopted the misappropriation tort and noting, “[u]nquestionably, New York is the state 
that has most heartily embraced the doctrine.”). 
 242 See Bruce W. Sanford, Bruce D. Brown & Laurie A. Babinski, Saving Journalism 
with Copyright Reform and the Doctrine of Hot News, 26 COMM. LAW. 1, 9 (2009) 
(listing California, Illinois, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania as states explicitly 
recognizing hot news misappropriation). 
 243 608 F. Supp. 2d 454 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). See supra text accompanying notes 219–225. 
 244 Id. at 460. 
 245 Id. at 460–61. 
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jurisdiction statute.246  The New York Court of Appeals, for 
example, responding to a certified question from the Second 
Circuit on the application of the state’s long-arm statute to a 
copyright infringement claim involving the uploading of a New 
York plaintiff’s works on the Internet by an out-of-state defendant, 
held that the situs of the injury for purposes of personal jurisdiction 
was the location of the copyright owner.247  The analysis seems 
equally applicable to misappropriation claims. 
The misappropriation rationale has been controversial since its 
inception.  Justice Holmes, dissenting at its creation, flatly rejected 
the notion that property arises from value, “even if it took labor 
and genius to make it.”248  Justice Brandeis agreed,249 and in his 
own oft-quoted dissent, he detailed the comparative advantages of 
legislation over the common law if property rights in news are 
indeed appropriate.250  Learned Hand, in a series of opinions for 
the Second Circuit, concluded that INS undermined the balance 
struck by federal copyright and patent law and effectively limited 
the case to its facts, since “[t]he difficulties of understanding it 
otherwise are insuperable.”251  Three-quarters of a century later, 
 
 246 See, e.g., Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 162–65 (N.Y. 
2011). 
 247 See Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 609 F.3d. 30 (2d Cir. 2010) 
certifying question to Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 946 N.E.2d 159, 165 
(N.Y. 2011).  The lower court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction was vacated. 
Penguin Group (USA) Inc. v. Am. Buddha, 640 F.3d 497, 501 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 248 INS, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Property, a creation of law, 
does not arise from value, although exchangeable—a matter of fact.”). 
249  But the fact that a product of the mind has cost its producer money 
and labor, and has a value for which others are willing to pay, is not 
sufficient to ensure to it this legal attribute of property.  The general 
rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions—knowledge, 
truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—become, after voluntary 
communication to others, free as the air to common use.   
Id. at 250 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 250 “Courts are ill-equipped to make the investigations which should precede a 
determination of the limitations which should be set upon any property right in news or 
of the circumstances under which news gathered by a private party should be deemed 
affected with a public interest.” Id. at 267 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 251 See Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 
281 U.S. 728 (1930); see also G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 
1952); Nat’l Comics Pub., Inc. v. Fawcett Pub., Inc., 191 F.2d 594, 603 (2d Cir. 1951); 
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Judge Posner was “hard pressed to find a case in which a claim of 
misappropriation should have succeeded.”252  Declaring the 
doctrine “alarmingly fuzzy once the extreme position of creating a 
legal right against all free riding is rejected,” he concluded, 
“[c]larity of analysis would be enhanced if the doctrine and the 
very word were banished from discussions of intellectual property 
law.”253  The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition similarly 
advocates an end to the doctrine, concluding that the cases “have 
not articulated coherent principles for its application.”254  The 
conflicting case law attests to the doctrine’s incoherence.255 
There is of course no general principle of law that prohibits a 
person or business from benefiting from the efforts of another, 
 
RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman 114 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 
(1940). 
 252 Posner, supra note 12, at 633. 
 253 Id. at 638, 641. 
 254 Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. b (1995) (“The better 
approach, and the one most likely to achieve an appropriate balance between the 
competitive interests, does not recognize a residual common law tort of 
misappropriation.”).  Although I drafted this comment as a co-reporter for the 
Restatement, the text was approved by the Advisors Committee, the Members 
Consultative Group, and both the Council and membership of the American Law 
Institute. 
 255 Compare, e.g., New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Nat’l Merch. Corp., 141 N.E.2d 702 
(Mass. 1957), with Nat’l Tel. Directory Co. v. Dawson Mfg. Co., 263 S.W. 483 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1924) (conflicting results when defendants sold covers with advertising for 
plaintiffs’ telephone directories); Nat’l Exhibition Co. v. Fass, 143 N.Y.S.2d 767 (Sup. 
Ct. 1955), and Twentieth Century Sporting Club, Inc. v. Transradio Press Serv., Inc., 300 
N.Y.S. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937) (enjoining the appropriation of information from 
broadcasts of sporting events to broadcast recreations of the events), with Loeb v. Turner, 
257 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (permitting recreated broadcasts); Pittsburgh 
Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938), with WCVB-TV v. 
Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42 (1st Cir. 1991) (divergent results on unlicensed live 
broadcasts of sporting events); Waring v. WDAS Broad. Station, Inc., 194 A. 631 (Pa. 
1937), with RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 
U.S. 712 (1940) (conflicting results on unauthorized radio broadcasts of musical 
recordings); Mut. Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Muzak Corp., 30 N.Y.S.2d 419 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1941), with Intermountain Broad. & Television Corp. v. Idaho Microwave, Inc., 196 F. 
Supp. 315 (D. Idaho 1961) (divergent results on retransmission of broadcast signals); 
Meyer v. Hurwitz, 5 F.2d 370 (E.D. Pa. 1925), app. dismissed, 10 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 
1926) (enjoining defendant’s use of plaintiff’s retail dispenser system for postcards), with 
Germanow v. Standard Unbreakable Watch Crystals, 27 N.E.2d 212 (N.Y. 1940) (no 
relief against defendant’s use of plaintiff’s cabinet system for replacement watch 
crystals). 
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even when that other is a direct competitor.256  Past attempts to 
constrain the scope of the misappropriation doctrine through 
canonical requirements do not inspire confidence.  Consider, for 
example, the Second Circuit’s careful articulation in NBA of the 
elements of the tort in New York, where the doctrine is most 
mature.257  The fifth of its five required elements demands that “the 
ability of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff 
would so reduce the incentive to produce the product or service 
that its existence or quality would be substantially threatened.”258  
This, according to Judge Posner, is the “meat” of the claim.259  But 
 
256 A small shop, for example, may freely benefit from the customers 
attracted by a nearby department store, a local manufacturer may 
benefit from increased demand attributable to the promotional efforts 
of a national manufacturer of similar goods, and a newspaper may 
benefit from reporting on the activities of local athletic teams.   
Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 38 cmt. b (1995). See, e.g., WCVB-TV v. 
Boston Athletic Ass’n, 926 F.2d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 1991) (“But, the man who clears a 
swamp, the developer of a neighborhood, the academic scientist, the school teacher, and 
millions of others, each day create ‘value’ (over and above what they are paid) that the 
law permits others to receive without charge.”); Nat’l Football League v. Governor of 
Del., 435 F. Supp. 1372, 1378 (D. Del. 1977). 
It is true that Delaware is thus making profits [from use of the 
plaintiff’s football scores in its state lottery] it would not make but for 
the existence of the NFL, but I find this difficult to distinguish from 
the multitude of charter bus companies who generate profit from 
serving those of plaintiffs’ fans who want to go to the stadium or, 
indeed, the sidewalk popcorn salesman who services the crowd as it 
surges towards the gate. 
Id. 
257 In our view, the elements central to an INS claim are: (i) the plaintiff 
generates or collects information at some cost or expense; (ii) the 
value of the information is highly time-sensitive; (iii) the defendant’s 
use of the information constitutes free-riding on the plaintiff’s costly 
efforts to generate or collect it; (iv) the defendant’s use of the 
information is in direct competition with a product or service offered 
by the plaintiff; (v) the ability of other parties to free-ride on the 
efforts of the plaintiff would so reduce the incentive to produce the 
product or service that its existence or quality would be substantially 
threatened.   
NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 852 (citations omitted).  These “sophisticated observations” were 
ultimately characterized as dicta in Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 901.   
 258 NBA, 105 F.3d at 852. 
 259 “The meat is in (v), with (i) through (iv) identifying the conditions in which the 
criterion stated in (v) is likely to be satisfied.” McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 534 
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on what basis can a court confidently predict the future business 
behavior of the plaintiff?  According to the district judge in 
Barclays, proof of “actual, quantifiable damage” is unnecessary.260  
The court granted the investment companies a permanent 
injunction against the copying of their stock recommendations 
based on the testimony of their own research executives about 
reduced incentives, supported by the “common sense” of the trial 
judge, despite the defendant’s argument that any reduction in the 
plaintiffs’ equity research would be caused primarily by the global 
recession and the rise of discount brokers.261  Another required 
element of the tort demands that “the defendant’s use of the 
information is in direct competition with a product or service 
offered by the plaintiff.”262  The defendant in Barclays argued that 
since the plaintiffs were in the brokerage business and it was a 
news aggregator, the direct competition requirement was not 
met.263  The district court, however, treated the plaintiffs’ 
production and dissemination of research reports as a primary 
business, competing directly with the defendant’s dissemination.264  
It is of course true that a company can be a direct competitor with 
respect to one but not another of a plaintiff’s products.  Ford 
competes directly with Honda in the car market even though, 
unlike Honda, it doesn’t also sell lawn mowers.  But the 
production of equity research is not one of the plaintiffs’ product 
markets.  The reports are merely one step in their effort to induce 
clients to engage in market transactions that generate brokerage 
 
(7th Cir. 2003) (noting that use at trial would not cause reporter to abandon biography of 
witness). 
 260 Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 342–43, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).  
Conversely, allegations of actual harm are not themselves sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement. See Scranton Times, LP v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. Co., 92 U.S.P.Q.2d 1269 
(M.D. Pa. 2009) (allegations that obituaries were copied by a rival newspaper); Fred 
Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. 
Mo. 1999) (“For a claim of misappropriation of ‘hot news’ to succeed, defendant’s 
actions must make plaintiff virtually cease to participate in the business in question.”). 
 261 Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 342, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 262 NBA, 105 F.3d at 852. 
 263 See Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 340, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 264 See id. at 340. 
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commissions—a market in which the defendant did not 
participate.265 
The uncertainties exposed by past applications of the “hot 
news” tort are magnified when the doctrine is exported into 
cyberspace.266  Are bloggers who offer or solicit commentary and 
analysis on reposted news stories in direct competition with the 
originating source of those stories?  Do aggregators that link to the 
originating sources even compete at all with the prior publisher?  
Do web sites that collect and disseminate information only on 
particular topics compete directly with general news sources like 
Associated Press or daily newspapers?  The answers are not 
obvious.267  And how are we to measure the impact of an 
 
 265 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in 
News, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (2011).  Balganesh offers a novel justification for the 
direct competition requirement, and for the misappropriation tort itself, understanding the 
doctrine as an attempt to preserve incentives for collaborative news-gathering efforts by 
barring free riders.  The direct competition requirement thus insures that the parties have 
sufficiently common interests in the resource that cost-reducing cooperation would be 
likely in the absence of misappropriation.  “Direct competition should thus be understood 
as a measure of parties’ likelihood of cooperating to lower input costs.” Id. at 474.  
Specifically rejecting the district court’s analysis in Barclays, the article notes:  
The parties’ products are thus hardly identical, and very different 
from that seen among newspapers competing in the same market. . . . 
[T]he plaintiff firms and the defendant are very unlikely to enter into 
a cooperative arrangement to defray the costs of their activities, since 
the expenditures derive from very different activities. . . . Had the 
court attempted to analyze direct competition through the lens of the 
hot news doctrine’s structural purposes and the theory of competitive 
enrichment that it is premised on, it would have been forced to 
conclude that this core element was completely missing.  
Id. at 476; see also Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive 
Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 75 MINN. L. REV. 875 (1991) (rejecting a property or 
moral basis for the tort in favor of an explanation based on competitive markets analysis). 
 266 This is not a novel insight. See, e.g., Gary Myers, The Restatement’s Rejection of the 
Misappropriation Tort: A Victory for the Public Domain, 47 S.C.L. REV. 673, 688 (1996) 
(“[T]he common-law property notions and broad unfair competition language of 
International News Service are ill-suited to addressing the concerns of either information 
producers or information users today.”); Dale P. Olson, Common Law Misappropriation 
in the Digital Era, 64 MO. L. REV. 837, 908 (1999) (“[A]s a doctrine of uncertain 
dimensions and unpredictable application, misappropriation as applied to the digital era 
has a high degree of uncertainty associated with its application.”). 
 267 Balganesh, supra note 163, at 476. 
Merely because an individual uses information collected by another, 
even if for commercial purposes, hardly renders him a direct 
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appropriation on future incentives in a market where consumers 
are typically not charged directly for the product and where content 
producers face a fundamental transformation of their industry that 
is largely unrelated to any alleged misappropriations?  Allowing 
the “hot news” tort to roam freely across the Internet is a 
momentous decision, and one that should be made only after 
considering whether the Internet is different in fundamental ways 
from the more tranquil analog news world. 
The potential scope of the misappropriation tort is dramatically 
broader in cyberspace than in an analog world.  The Supreme 
Court in INS took great care to distinguish the parties’ rights 
against each other from their rights against the public.268  As to the 
latter, the Court assumed “that neither party has any property 
interest as against the public in uncopyrighted news matter after 
the moment of its publication.”269  But on the Internet, where every 
blogger, analyst, or excited reader can instantly redistribute 
information around the globe to the potential detriment of the 
originator, the distinction between competitor and public breaks 
down.  In addition, information subject to a misappropriation claim 
must be “hot,” or as stated in the list of required elements in NBA, 
“the value of the information [must be] highly time-sensitive.”270  
 
competitor in the collective action sense in which the requirement 
emerged. In other words, a blogger is unlikely to be incentivized (by 
the misappropriation doctrine) to enter the enterprise of news 
collection—the doctrine’s core objective.  An action against a 
blogger is unlikely to result in the blogger independently collecting 
the news, or indeed in joining a cooperative effort for this purpose.  
To equate direct competition with the mere use of the same product, 
or indeed its effects on a collector’s sales would dilute the 
requirement of its core significance. 
Id.; see Clay Calvert, Kayla Gutierrez, & Christina Locke, All the News That’s Fit to 
Own: Hot News on the Internet and the Commodification of News in Digital Culture, 11 
WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L. J. 1, 23 (2009) (“Bloggers simply are not news services; 
both may supply important information that many people may consider to be news, but 
merely trafficking in similar information does not put them in direct competition.”). 
 268 INS, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). 
 269 Id. 
 270 NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 852; see, e.g., BanxCorp v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 723 F. 
Supp. 2d 596, 612 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“To satisfy the second element, Plaintiffs must 
allege not only that the news was time-sensitive when it was gathered, but that it was 
time-sensitive when it was misappropriated.”); cf. Fin. Info., Inc. v. Moody’s Investors 
Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987) (“The 
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But this concept too is problematic on the Internet.  In one sense, 
much of what people do on the Internet involves time-sensitive 
information—not just consuming and sharing traditional local, 
national, and international news, but also distributing personal “hot 
news” through social media networks like Twitter and Facebook.  
The natural lead-time advantage that can temper the need for legal 
intervention also virtually disappears in an environment of 
instantaneous distribution.  Yet in another sense, that same 
environment effectively insures that no news on the Internet is 
truly “hot.”  It is impossible for a second user to obtain the kind of 
head start (or even simultaneous start) with the originator in 
specific markets that INS achieved over AP with respect to 
newspapers distributed later in the middle and western United 
States.  On the Internet, no one can deprive the originator of its 
head start with everyone everywhere, since appropriation is only 
possible after the originator has had the opportunity to present the 
information to its entire intended audience.271  Hot news cools very 
quickly in cyberspace.272 
The “hot news” tort targets free riding.273  But this animosity 
toward copying is arguably inconsistent with a medium of 
 
‘hot’ news doctrine is concerned with the copying and publication of information 
gathered by another before he has been able to utilize his competitive edge.”).  This 
criterion is subject to a range of interpretations. See, e.g., U.S. Trotting Ass’n v. Chicago 
Downs Ass’n, Inc., 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (finding data on past horse races 
protectable). 
 271 Brief for Amici Curiae Google Inc. and Twitter, Inc. in Support of Reversal, 
Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 2589770 at *17. 
[U]sers of online services such as Twitter, who post facts or 
commentary regarding news stories, are relaying information already 
in the public domain.  This is in stark contrast to INS, where INS was 
able to take advantage of AP-originated content because of a three-
hour time difference.  The Internet has no time zones—once a news 
article is made publicly available, it is available to all. 
Id. 
 272 Even the injunction granted by the district court in Barclays restrained publication of 
equity recommendations issued during the trading day for only two hours. See Barclays I, 
700 F. Supp. 2d at 347, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 273 NBA, 105 F.3d at 852 (“[T]he defendant’s use of the information constitutes free-
riding on the plaintiff’s costly efforts to generate or collect it.”).  The requirement often 
demands little more than copying. See, e.g., Scranton Times, LP v. Wilkes-Barre Pub. 
Co., 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (defendant newspaper that “simply 
copied” death notices from rival newspaper satisfied the “free-riding” requirement). 
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communication built on links and search engines designed to 
facilitate access to any information that has been released on the 
Internet.  One well known explanation of INS and its progeny sees 
the tort as firmly rooted in the customs of traditional news-
gathering.274  Customs on the Internet are different, and a doctrine 
that fails to take account of that difference cannot hope to achieve 
stability.275  It is worth noting that, unlike the AP during World 
War I, online news purveyors have technological tools available to 
restrict the unauthorized copying of their products.276  Technical 
protections, however, impose a cost on owners by limiting access 
by users who might otherwise be a source of increased advertising 
revenue or other profit for the originator.  Having instead made the 
choice to participate in the online culture, it may not be 
unwarranted to find an implied license for subsequent 
distribution.277 
The uncertainties surrounding the scope—and indeed the 
continuing existence—of the misappropriation tort are especially 
troubling when the target of the claim is speech.  Judge Posner, 
characterizing the tort as “a doctrine of irreducible vagueness,” 
 
 274 Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom and 
Law as Sources of Property Rights in News, 78 VA. L. REV. 85, 91 (1992). 
 275 Cf. Brief for Amici Curiae Google Inc. and Twitter, Inc., supra note 271, at *14 (“In 
a world of citizen journalists and commentators, online news organizations, and 
broadcasters who compete 24 hours a day, news can no longer be contained for any 
meaningful amount of time.”). 
 276  [N]ewsgatherers can employ mechanisms to limit access to their 
content, including technical barriers to prevent broad access to 
content they make available online.  For example, websites 
commonly use simple programming instructions known as 
“robots.txt” files to communicate instructions (such as instructions 
not to link to material on the site) to search engines and news 
aggregators.  Such instructions are simple to implement, widely 
adopted, and provide an automated way for a site to prevent search 
engines and aggregators from linking to a web page.  In addition, 
websites can restrict broad access to online content by using 
password-protected platforms.  To the extent that information is 
shielded by sufficient technological measures, online services will 
not index content from such sites.   
Id. at *25–26 (footnote omitted). 
 277 See Field v. Google Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1115–16 (D. Nev. 2006) (noting that 
the failure to use technological signals that would prevent caching of website was treated 
as an implied license to cache). 
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worried that the NBA elements “cannot tell a would-be 
‘misappropriator’ whether his conduct is likely to cross the legal 
line.”278  The doctrine’s potential to chill speech is an obvious and 
fundamental concern.279  The district court in Barclays, 
acknowledging the public interest in unrestrained access to 
information, relied on an analogy to the balance between incentive 
and public access drawn by intellectual property law.280  Unlike the 
misappropriation tort, however, the fields of intellectual property 
law that regulate speech all have internal limitations that operate to 
lessen conflicts with First Amendment interests.  Copyright, for 
example, protects only an author’s expression and not the 
underlying ideas, which remain open to all, and its fair use doctrine 
further accommodates free speech interests.281  Trademark law is 
 
 278 Posner, supra note 12, at 638. 
 279 See Brief for Amici Curiae Citizen Media Law Project, Electronic Frontier Fd., and 
Public Citizen, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 
2647631 at *23 (“If mainstream media outlets, bloggers, and other non-traditional 
journalists are unsure whether they are violating the law, they may well think twice about 
sharing newsworthy information out of ‘timidity and self-censorship.’”) (quoting Cox 
Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)). 
280 Ultimately, the purpose of the INS tort, like the traditionally accepted 
goal of intellectual property law more generally, is to provide an 
incentive for the production of socially useful information without 
either under—or over—protecting the efforts to gather such 
information.  A balance must be struck between establishing rewards 
to stimulate socially useful efforts on the one hand, and permitting 
maximum access to the fruits of those efforts to facilitate still further 
innovation and progress on the other.  What the Supreme Court said 
in Harper & Row on the subject of copyright protection is no less 
applicable here: “The challenge of copyright is to strike the difficult 
balance between the interests of authors . . . in the control and 
exploitation of their writings . . . on the one hand, and society’s 
competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and 
commerce on the other hand.” 
Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 344, rev’d, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Harper & 
Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)).  Judge Cote, however, held 
that the defendant had waived any First Amendment defense. Id. at 352–54. 
 281 The point is emphasized in the very case cited by Judge Cote to support the analogy 
to intellectual property:  
In view of the First Amendment’s protections embodied in the Act’s 
distinction between copyrightable expression and uncopyrightable 
facts and ideas, and the latitude for scholarship and comment 
traditionally afforded by fair use, there is no warrant for expanding, 
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mainly limited to commercial speech, with its reduced level of 
constitutional protection.282  Trade secrets law does not extend 
protection to information that is publicly available.283  The right of 
publicity, which bars unauthorized exploitation of an individual’s 
name or likeness for commercial purposes, does not extend to use 
in news reporting.284  The misappropriation doctrine incorporates 
no analogous internal safeguards; protection for free speech 
interests can come only from the external constraint of the First 
Amendment. 
Remarkably, there has never been a full-blown First 
Amendment analysis of the “hot news” tort by a federal appellate 
court.285  The majority opinion in INS reveals no concern with free 
speech issues, and even the Brandeis dissent contains only a brief 
reference, on public policy grounds, to the propriety of enjoining 
the publication of news.286  The absence of a substantial First 
Amendment analysis in the 1918 INS opinion is not surprising, 
coming as it does more than a decade before the Supreme Court 
began to develop a robust First Amendment jurisprudence 
 
as respondents contend should be done, the fair use doctrine to what 
amounts to a public figure exception to copyright.   
Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985).  In Eldred v. 
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 191 (2003), the Court indicated that copyright’s immunity from 
First Amendment scrutiny might be limited to cases in which “Congress has not altered 
the traditional contours of copyright protection.” 
 282 See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 
562–63 (1980). 
 283 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) (limiting a “trade secret” 
to information that is not “generally known” or “readily ascertainable by proper means”). 
 284 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 47, cmt. c (1995) (“The use of a 
person’s identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing 
ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person’s right of publicity.”).  In 
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), the Court held that a 
broadcast of the plaintiff’s entire human cannonball act by a local news channel was too 
substantial to qualify as permissible news coverage, noting, “[i]t is evident, and there is 
no claim here to the contrary, that petitioner’s state-law right of publicity would not serve 
to prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy facts about petitioner’s act.” Id. at 
574.  
 285 See Balganesh, supra note 265, at 489 (“[N]o court has examined the extent to 
which the action remains compatible with the constitutional guarantees of free speech 
under the First Amendment.”). 
 286 INS, 248 U.S. 215, 266 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
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beginning perhaps with Near v. Minnesota287 in 1931.  The Second 
Circuit in NBA, deciding in the defendant’s favor on the 
misappropriation count and vacating the lower court’s injunction, 
saw no need to address the First Amendment defense.288  The First 
Amendment issue was similarly avoided in Barclays when the 
court held that the misappropriation claim was preempted by the 
Copyright Act.289 
Academic analysis of the First Amendment question has 
revealed significant unresolved issues.  Examining legislative 
proposals that would give newspapers increased control over their 
stories and headlines on the Internet, Professor Yen concludes that 
potential overbreadth in the scope of the regulated speech makes it 
likely that such protection would run afoul of the First 
Amendment.290  Professor Balganesh notes the applicability of the 
rule against prior restraints to injunctions against the 
misappropriation of “hot news.”291  Perhaps as argued in an amicus 
brief in the Barclays case (and by the district court in NBA), the 
misappropriation doctrine survives First Amendment scrutiny as a 
content-neutral regulation supported by a substantial governmental 
interest and narrowly tailored by the required elements of the 
tort.292  However, the constitutional issues remain contentious and 
unresolved,293 only adding to the general uncertainty surrounding 
the misappropriation tort. 
 
 287 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
 288 NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 854 n.10 (2d Cir. 1997).   
 289 See Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d. Cir. 2011). 
 290 See Yen, supra note 68, at 970.   
 291 See Balganesh, supra note 265, at 491–92; see also Sherrod, supra note 238, at 
1227.    
 292 Brief for Amicus Curiae Reed Elsevier Inc. in Support of Affirmance, Barclays II, 
650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 3032825 at *1920.  The lower 
court in NBA defended the constitutionality of an injunction by arguing that it was 
content neutral and barred only a particular means of reporting on the games. Nat’l 
Basketball Ass’n v. Sports Team Analysis & Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 
1086–87, rev’d, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997). See also Corrected Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellees, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 2935558 at 
*50–51 (arguing that “[b]ecause the ‘hot news’ doctrine inherently accommodates First 
Amendment interests, there is no need for the separate First Amendment scrutiny Fly and 
its amici contend is mandated”). 
 293 Attacks on the constitutionality of the “hot news” tort typically raise two issues.  
One attack questions whether liability can be imposed, consistent with the First 
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C. Preemption 
Debating the contours and ultimate wisdom of the “hot news” 
tort should be a purely academic exercise; any actual use of the 
state tort to protect news on the Internet—or anywhere else—
seems clearly preempted by the federal Copyright Act.  According 
to section 301 of the Copyright Act, neither the common law nor 
statutes of any state can grant 
[l]egal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any 
of the exclusive rights within the general scope of 
copyright as specified by Section 106 in works of 
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression and come within the subject matter of 
copyright as specified by Sections 102 and 103.294 
Analysis under section 301 proceeds by asking whether the 
object of the state protection falls within the subject matter of the 
copyright statute, and whether the nature of the state protection is 
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights enjoyed by a copyright 
owner, most notably, the right to prevent unauthorized 
reproduction.295  If a state statute or common law doctrine is 
invoked to protect a computer program, a literary manuscript, or a 
character, the “subject matter” element of section 301 is met, and if 
the nature of the state protection is equivalent to a right against 
unauthorized reproduction, the second element too is satisfied and 
application of the state law is preempted.296  On the other hand, if 
 
Amendment, for distributing newsworthy information that has been lawfully obtained. 
See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 
10-1372), 2010 WL 2589041 at *3538; Brief for Amici Curiae Citizen Media Law 
Project, Elec. Frontier Fd., & Pub. Citizen, Inc., Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(No. 10-1372), 2010 WL 2647631 at *12; Brief for Amicus Curiae Streetaccount LLC in 
Support of Defendant-Appellant, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 
2010 WL 2589769 at *9–13.  The other attack questions whether an injunction against 
future misappropriations violates the rule against prior restraints. Id. at *13–14; Reply 
Brief for Defendant-Appellant, Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1372), 
2010 WL 3032827 at *1824; Brief for Amici Curiae Google Inc. and Twitter, Inc., supra 
note 271, at *19–26. 
 294 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2006). 
 295 Id. § 106(1). 
 296 See, e.g., Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 1993) (Virginia 
Computer Crimes Act claim); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. 
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the state law protects a plaintiff not against unauthorized 
reproduction but, as with trademark law, against consumer 
confusion as to source, or as with trade secret law, against breaches 
of confidence, the state protection is not preempted.297  The 
legislative history explains equivalency as an inquiry into whether 
the state “causes of action contain elements, such as an invasion of 
personal rights or a breach of trust or confidentiality, that are 
different in kind from copyright infringement.”298  To escape 
preemption, however, the extra “elements” must change the nature 
and not merely the scope of the state right.  Elements like intent or 
scienter, although not required for copyright infringement, are not 
themselves sufficient to preserve a state cause of action.299 
The NBA’s claim that game statistics had been 
misappropriated from its broadcasts for use with the defendants’ 
pager system prompted an influential analysis of the preemption 
issue by the Second Circuit.300  Focusing first on the subject matter 
requirement for preemption in section 301, the court faced the 
question of whether this application of the misappropriation tort 
could escape preemption because only uncopyrightable facts had 
been taken.301  The “subject matter of copyright” as used in section 
301 could be interpreted to include only matter that is protected by 
the Copyright Act.  That narrow approach was rejected in NBA, 
and the court sensibly concluded that the reach of section 301 
extended to both the copyrightable and uncopyrightable elements 
of a work, thus avoiding the perverse result that states remain free 
 
denied, 479 U.S. 820 (1986) (unjust enrichment claim); Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy 
Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (unfair competition claim). 
 297 Examples on trademark and passing off include, Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., 
Inc. v. Cont’l Homes, Inc., 785 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1986) and Warner Bros., Inc. v. Am. 
Broad. Cos., Inc., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983); examples of breaches of confidence 
include, Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993) and 
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 298 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 100, at 132. 
 299 See, e.g., Crow v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1224, 1226 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 819 (1984); Harper & Row Pub., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 204–05 
(2d Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 300 See NBA, 105 F.3d 841, 848–55 (2d Cir. 1997). 
 301 See id. at 848–50. 
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to protect material that Congress has specifically left in the public 
domain.302 
Next for the NBA court came the question of whether the 
misappropriation tort offered protection that was “equivalent” to 
copyright.  The court began its analysis with a conclusion drawn 
from an earlier Second Circuit decision: “Courts are generally 
agreed that some form of such a [misappropriation] claim survives 
preemption.”303  The statement was followed by a quotation from 
the legislative history of section 301 on which that earlier case had 
relied: 
“Misappropriation” is not necessarily synonymous 
with copyright infringement, and thus a cause of 
action labeled as “misappropriation” is not 
preempted if it is in fact based neither on a right 
within the general scope of copyright as specified 
by section 106 nor on a right equivalent thereto.  
For example, state law should have the flexibility to 
afford a remedy (under traditional principles of 
equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized 
appropriation by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not 
the literary expression) constituting “hot” news, 
whether in the traditional mold of International 
News Service v. Associated Press, or in the newer 
form of data updates from scientific, business, or 
financial data bases.304 
 
 302 See id. at 849.  Other cases employing a similar interpretation of the “subject matter” 
requirement in section 301 include Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446 (6th 
Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1114 (2002); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 
(7th Cir. 1996); and Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody’s Investors Serv., Inc., 808 
F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).  This interpretation is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s understanding of copyright preemption as articulated 
prior to the enactment of section 301 in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570 
(1973), finding that state protection is limited to material left “unattended” by Congress. 
 303 NBA, 105 F.3d at 850 (citing Financial Information, 808 F.2d at 208). 
 304 NBA, 105 F.3d at 850 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132 (1976)) (citation 
omitted).  Other cases indicating that this passage from the House Report preserves at 
least some applications of state misappropriation law include Agora Financial, LLC v. 
Samler, 725 F. Supp. 2d 491, 496 (D. Md. 2010); X17, Inc. v. Lavandeira, 563 F. Supp. 
2d 1102, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2007); Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, 
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That said, the court in NBA moved directly to a consideration 
of the “breadth of the ‘hot news’ claim that survives 
preemption.”305  After describing the elements of a “hot news” 
misappropriation claim, the court looked for “extra elements” that 
distinguished the state right from copyright, and found these: 
We therefore find the extra elements—those in 
addition to the elements of copyright 
infringement—that allow a “hot-news” claim to 
survive preemption are: (i) the time-sensitive value 
of factual information, (ii) the free-riding by a 
defendant, and (iii) the threat to the very existence 
of the product or service provided by the 
plaintiff.306 
It is a questionable list.  The first “extra element” merely 
narrows the subject matter of the tort.  A state prohibition against 
copying material from some small subset of works—stories about 
boy wizards or photographs of Madonna—would surely still be 
preempted.  The second element—free riding—is usually satisfied 
in a misappropriation case by proof of copying, which is exactly 
equivalent to the primary protection afforded by copyright.  The 
third element merely links the state right against copying to the 
degree of resulting harm.  A state statute aimed at keeping record 
companies in business by prohibiting the sharing of music files on 
the Internet would still be preempted. 
When Barclays objected to the appropriation of its stock 
recommendations by Fly, the district court, after quoting the same 
legislative history, said that the NBA case had “finally resolved” 
 
Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 1049 (E.D. Mo. 1999); and Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 F. Supp. 
823, 834 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 305 NBA, 105 F.3d at 850. 
 306 Id. at 853. Not everyone agrees. See Sherrod, supra note 238, at 1224 (“The extra 
elements laid out in National Basketball Ass’n do not differ qualitatively from copyright; 
they only describe the nature of the copying.”). See also, e.g., Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. 
Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 2d 737, 756 (D. Md. 2003) (“‘Free-riding,’ however, the 
only element that constitutes a wrongful act, seems indistinguishable from the right to 
reproduce, perform, distribute or display a work.”).  The NBA’s misappropriation claim 
was ultimately rejected because it failed to establish sufficient competitive impact on its 
main businesses of staging and broadcasting basketball games, a necessary component of 
a non-preempted claim. See NBA, 105 F.3d at 853–54. 
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the question of whether a “hot news” claim survives preemption,307 
and applied the elements of a “surviving” misappropriation claim 
taken from that case to enjoin the defendant.308 
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with NBA’s interpretation 
of the subject matter requirement—Barclays could not avoid 
preemption by arguing that the copied securities recommendations 
were not themselves copyrightable, since the reports from which 
they were taken were clearly within the subject matter of the 
statute.309  Quoting the identical legislative history, the court also 
agreed with NBA that “INS-like state-law torts would survive 
preemption.”310  But according to the majority in Barclays, NBA’s 
five-part description of the elements of a misappropriation claim 
that would survive preemption was dicta.311  As for Barclays’ 
claim, it was not sufficiently “INS-like” to avoid preemption.312  
Fly was not free riding in the INS sense.  It had not copied news 
gathered by Barclays, but instead was collecting and reporting 
news made by Barclays and similar organizations.  It was also not 
clear, again in contrast to INS, that the defendant had diverted the 
plaintiff’s profits—commissions on the securities transactions it 
hoped to generate through its recommendations—to itself.  In a bit 
of its own speculation, the court said that if the plaintiff had 
instead collected and disseminated facts about securities 
recommendations in the brokerage industry, it might well have a 
valid misappropriation claim against a defendant who copied 
 
 307 Barclays I, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), rev’d in part, 650 F.3d 876 
(2d Cir. 2011). 
 308 See id. at 335–43. 
 309 See Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 902. 
 310 Id. at 894. 
311 [I]n NBA, the Court held that the facts of that case could not support a 
non-preempted “hot news” claim.  Its language regarding the 
elements that might in some later case allow a claim to avoid 
preemption, and its discussion of why such an exception to 
preemption was narrow, were useful commentaries on the reasoning 
and possible implications of the Court’s holding.  But the language 
itself was not meant to, and did not, bind us, the district court, or any 
other court to subsequently consider this subject.   
Id. at 899 n.32 (emphasis in original). 
 312 Id. at 905. 
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them,313 specifically referring to AP’s claim against the copying of 
its news in the All Headline News case.314 
Judge Raggi concurred in an insightful opinion that rejected the 
majority’s conclusion that NBA’s five-part description of a non-
preempted misappropriation was dicta.315  But Barclays’ claim 
failed the NBA test, she believed, because the defendant’s conduct 
was not sufficiently competitive with the plaintiff’s business.316  
Like the majority, she cited All Headline News as an example of a 
claim that might survive preemption.317  Although Judge Raggi 
thought herself bound by NBA, she remained skeptical about 
“whether the test adequately identifies tort claims with ‘extra 
elements’ qualitatively different from the rights protected by 
copyright.”318 
Judge Raggi also made an all too rare observation about the 
legislative history on which the NBA analysis rests.  The passage 
on misappropriation quoted from the House Report was 
specifically directed at a portion of section 301 in the copyright 
revision bill that was deleted prior to enactment.319  At the time 
that the House Report quoted in NBA was written, the copyright 
revision bill included a provision preserving rights under state law 
with respect to: 
[A]ctivities violating legal or equitable rights that 
are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights 
within the general scope of copyright as specified 
by section 106, including rights against 
misappropriation not equivalent to any such 
exclusive rights, breaches of contract, breaches of 
trust, trespass, conversion, invasion of privacy, 
 
 313 Id. at 905–06. 
 314 Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp., 608 F. Supp. 2d 454, 457–58 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009); see supra text accompanying notes 219–25. 
 315 Barclays II, 650 F.3d at 911 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
 316 Id. at 913 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
 317 Id. at 914 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
 318 Id. at 911 (Raggi, J., concurring). 
 319 Id. at 910 (Raggi, J., concurring).  Similar observations were made in Baltimore 
Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 676 n.25 (7th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987) and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 
640, 659–60 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996). 
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defamation, and deceptive trade practices such as 
passing off and false representation.320 
This attempt to preserve at least some applications of 
misappropriation was a complete turnaround from prior versions of 
the revision bill, which had included no reference to 
misappropriation in the list of preserved state rights.321  Indeed, an 
earlier House Report had stated, “where the cause of action 
involves the form of unfair competition commonly referred to as 
‘misappropriation,’ which is nothing more than copyright 
protection under another name, section 301 is intended to have 
preemptive effect.”322  Misappropriation (along with trespass and 
conversion) first appeared in the section 301 list of unpreempted 
rights in the 1975 Senate bill, along with the now-familiar 
reference to INS in the accompanying Senate Report.323  The 
House Report, written the following year, contained the identical 
comment on INS.324  During the final Senate debate before passage 
of the revision bill, Senator Hugh Scott expressed regret that time 
did not permit consideration of an amendment to delete the 
reference to misappropriation from section 301.  He included in the 
record a letter from the Department of Justice expressing fear that 
the recent addition of misappropriation in section 301, which it 
labeled “a vague and uncertain” theory, would “defeat the 
underlying purpose of the preemption section.”325  When the 
House took up the Senate bill, Representative Seiberling offered an 
amendment to delete the entire list of examples in section 
301(b)(3), citing the Justice Department’s objection to the 
inclusion of misappropriation.  But Seiberling, prompted by a 
 
 320 S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1975), quoted in H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 24 
(1976). 
 321 See, e.g., H.R. 4347, 89th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1966). See generally Henry D. Fetter, 
Copyright Revision and the Preemption of State “Misappropriation” Law: A Study in 
Judicial and Congressional Interaction, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 367 (1978) (tracing 
the drafting history of the preemption provision). 
 322 H.R. REP. NO. 89-2237, at 129 (1966). 
 323 S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1975), quoted in Fetter, supra note 321, at 417.  The 
passage on misappropriation quoted from the House Report by the court in NBA appeared 
for the first time in Senate Report 473. S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 116 (1975).  
 324 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132. 
 325 See 122 Cong. Rec. 3836-37 (1976) (letter to Hon. Hugh Scott from Thomas 
Kauper, Asst. Att. General, Antitrust Div. (Feb. 13, 1976).  
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query from Representative Railsback, also offered a different—and 
inconsistent—explanation, expressing a desire merely to avoid 
encouraging states to adopt the doctrine.326  The amendment 
deleting the list was adopted and the revision bill was passed.327  
The Conference Committee accepted the House amendment 
without comment.328 
This bit of history is generally known to copyright scholars, 
although apparently less so to the courts.  Less well known entirely 
is the origin of this fleeting appearance of misappropriation in 
section 301 and the accompanying legislative history that has 
proved so difficult to ignore.  My casebook co-author Ralph 
Brown traced the entire episode to a 1975 report from American 
Bar Association Committee No. 309—Copyright and New 
Technology (“ABA Committee Report”), disapproving any 
limitation on rights against misappropriation in the copyright 
revision bill.329  The ABA Committee Report, prepared for an 
ABA meeting in August 1975, included a proposed revision of 
section 301 to protect the misappropriation tort and a list of 
examples, including INS, where misappropriation protection 
should remain available.330  By November, when the Senate Report 
on the revision bill was published, the proposed change had been 
incorporated into the bill verbatim and the list of examples from 
 
 326 See 122 Cong. Rec. 32,015 (1976). 
 327 See id.  
 328 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1733, at 78–79 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5810, 5819–20.  
 329 Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 
24 UCLA  L. REV. 1070, 1101 n.161 (1977) (citing A.B.A. Section of Patent, Trademark 
and Copyright Law, Committee Reports to be Presented at [Aug. 1975] Meeting, REPORT 
OF COMMITTEE NO. 309, COPYRIGHT AND NEW TECHNOLOGY 177 (1975) [hereinafter 
ABA COMMITTEE REPORT]).  We mentioned this small discovery in a footnote in our 
casebook on copyright law. See RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, COPYRIGHT 
635 n.f (7th ed. 1998).  Unfortunately, a casebook footnote is apparently not the best way 
to get the word out.   
 330 ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 329, at 180–82.  Another justification offered 
for the proposed amendment to section 301 was to achieve compatibility with a pending 
federal codification of the misappropriation doctrine, which was never enacted. Id. at 
181. 
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the ABA Committee Report was inserted in the Senate Report.331  
The identical list of examples, including the reference to INS, soon 
also appeared in the House Report.332  The ABA Committee 
Report establishes beyond doubt that the legislative history relied 
on in cases like NBA and Barclays was intended not as 
commentary on the general statutory concept of “equivalent” 
rights, but was instead an attempt to justify a specific last-minute 
amendment to the bill—an amendment that was subsequently 
struck from the bill before it was enacted.333 
Reliance on this legislative history in cases like NBA and 
Barclays seems questionable for another reason.  It is probably not 
a coincidence that the four examples of misappropriation described 
in the ABA Committee Report and subsequently reproduced in the 
Senate and House reports all involve the protection of “facts” or 
“data.”334  The thrust of the concern seems to be that the copyright 
revision bill would preempt state protection for matter that is not 
protected by copyright.  This is apparent on a close reading of the 
reference to the INS case.  Both the ABA Committee Report and 
matching legislative history carefully limit the target of state 
protection to “‘hot’ news”: “For example, state law should have 
the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional principles of 
equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation 
by a competitor of the facts (i.e., not the literary expression) 
constituting ‘hot’ news .”335  If protection against misappropriation 
is indeed not equivalent to copyright, the parenthetical excluding 
state protection for literary expression is meaningless.  The tort 
would be available to protect any subject matter.  The exclusion of 
state protection for literary expression reveals the ABA 
Committee’s real concern: copyright should not preempt state 
protection for uncopyrightable subject matter.336  But both NBA 
 
 331 S. 22, 94th Cong. § 301(b)(3) (1975), quoted in S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 20 (1975).  
The examples from the ABA Committee Report appear in Senate Report 473. See S. REP. 
NO. 94-473, at 116. 
 332 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132. 
 333 See ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 329, at 177–82. 
 334 See id. 
 335 ABA COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 329, at 180; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 132. 
 336 Some cases have interpreted the legislative history as preserving misappropriation 
claims only for uncopyrightable material. See Agora Fin., LLC v. Samler, 725 F. Supp. 
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and Barclays flatly reject that proposition, holding that preemption 
can reach even uncopyrightable subject matter in a copyrighted 
work.337 
What if the reference to misappropriation and INS in the 
legislative history is ignored, as it should be?338  The case law 
already provides the answer.  In misappropriation cases that 
involve the “subject matter of copyright” but not “hot news,” i.e., 
where the reference to INS is irrelevant, the courts have been 
virtually unanimous in holding that a misappropriation cause of 
action is preempted.339 
 
2d 491, 501–02 (D. Md. 2010); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 
1523, 1533 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also 1 NIMMER, supra note 58, § 101[B][2][b] (“[O]ne 
could plausibly maintain that the misappropriation protection preserved by the legislative 
history relates to ‘subject matter’ outside of copyright.”). 
 337 See supra text accompanying notes 302 and 309. 
 338 This may be easier said than done.  District court judges in the Second Circuit are 
presumably bound by NBA’s ruling that the legislative history justifies the conclusion that 
some applications of the misappropriation tort survive preemption.  Panels in subsequent 
Second Circuit cases are also apparently bound by that ruling.  “[T]his panel is bound by 
prior decisions of this court unless and until the precedents established therein are 
reversed en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Jass, 569 F.3d 47, 58 (2d 
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 2138 (2010).  This proposition was cited by the 
majority in Barclays. Barclays II, 650 F.3d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 2011).  Thus, although the 
judges in Barclays more clearly understood the questionable relevance, if not the 
provenance of the legislative history, “[t]he NBA panel decided the case before it, and we 
think that the law it thus made regarding ‘hot news’ preemption is, as we have tried to 
explain, determinative here.” Id. at 899.  
 339 See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 302 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(screenplay); Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 879 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 
820 (1986) (research notes); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 247 
(2d Cir. 1983) (character); Brainard v. Vassar, 561 F. Supp. 2d 922, 932 (M.D. Tenn. 
2008) (songs); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 661 (W.D. Wis.), rev’d on 
other grounds, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (telephone listings); Nash v. CBS, Inc., 704 
F. Supp. 823, 835 (N.D. Ill. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, 899 F.2d 1537 (7th Cir. 1990) 
(literary work); Mayer v. Josiah Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535–36 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (snowflake design); Schuchart & Assocs., Inc. v. Solo Serve Corp., 540 
F. Supp. 928, 944–45 (W.D. Tex. 1982) (architectural drawings); Fairway Contractors, 
Inc. v. Ahern, 970 P.2d 954, 957 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (home design); see also 1 
NIMMER, supra note 58, § 1.01[B][1][f][iii] at 1-48 (“[L]egions of cases have held pre-
empted claims for misappropriation.”) (footnotes omitted).  Some cases have held that 
state protection for works of authorship may also be preempted under the Supremacy 
Clause. See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(statute enforcing “shrink wrap” restrictions against copying software).  State protection 
of facts in a copyrighted work through the misappropriation doctrine may conflict with 
the federal prohibition of copyright protection for facts, and hence may “[stand] as an 
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CONCLUSION 
Newspapers, investment firms, and other content providers 
seek to control the distribution of their work on the Internet.  
Copyright law already protects the text of their news, at least 
against most commercial copiers, although their headlines may be 
too small and too useful as titles to merit separate protection as 
works of authorship.  News providers want more.  They are 
pressing to expand copyright into the previously forbidden realm 
of facts by arguing that creativity in the “creation” of “soft” facts is 
sufficient for protection.  But copyright law demands creativity in 
the manner of expression, which statements of isolated facts 
generally lack.  Facts, whether “soft” and “created” or “hard” and 
“discovered,” belong in the public domain where the Copyright 
Act clearly puts them.  Extending protection to facts also 
fundamentally alters the contours of copyright in a way that 
undermines its traditional insulation from scrutiny under the First 
Amendment. 
Content providers are also seeking to resurrect the century-old 
tort of misappropriation, a contentious and formless doctrine with a 
notably checkered history.  It is especially dangerous in 
cyberspace, where it conflicts with the structure and culture of the 
Internet and where a central premise of the doctrine—the 
distinction between a competitor and the public—quickly breaks 
down.  Unlike traditional intellectual property doctrine, the 
misappropriation tort lacks internal limitations that temper 
conflicts with the First Amendment, and its inherent uncertainty, 
magnified on the Internet, chills protected speech.  Application of 
the tort to protect “hot news” is plainly preempted by federal 
copyright law.  The misappropriation doctrine prohibits copying—
a right precisely equivalent to copyright’s ban on unauthorized 
reproduction.  A passage in the legislative history indisputably 
 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.” Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). See 3 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
58, § 17.3.3, at 17:41 (“Although the Copyright Act withholds federal protection from 
ideas and facts, and does not forbid their protection under state law, cases may arise in 
which state protection of ideas or facts will so offend the federal balance that it will be 
invalidated under the supremacy clause.”). 
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directed at a provision that was intentionally removed from the 
copyright revision bill should not alter that obvious conclusion. 
 
